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Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model
SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is experiencing incredible
growth. ADR courses, clinics, conferences and seminars have proliferated.
Law students are beginning to consider the field of ADR as a viable career
option. Journals devoted solely to ADR have met with success, 1 and
scholars have contributed more and more articles and essays to fill those
journals. The American Bar Association has recently established a new
ADR section. Yet, for many of us, ADR remains abstract, interesting and
thought-provoking but not very relevant to our daily lives.
This article was conceived after its author was provided with an
opportunity to "practice what she preached"--to put ADR to work within
an organizational framework. The process forced a rethinking about ADR
and resulted in the examination of one rather unfamiliar ADR mechanism
and its relationship to the well-known, widely accepted practice of
mediation. The article focuses on an ADR mechanism which has received
little recent attention from lawyers interested in ADR, but which may
nevertheless prove to be an effective ADR option: the ombuds office.
Supplanting mediation with the ombuds model can produce an ADR
mechanism strong in mediation, yet preferable to it.
Part II describes the circumstances which led the author to consider
various ADR mechanisms. Part III describes the process chosen-the
ombuds office-and traces its history and evolution. Part IV addresses the
strengths and weaknesses of this process and Part V discusses both the
widespread use and shortcomings of the more familiar ADR process of
mediation. Finally, Part VI describes the advantages of the ADR process
chosen to address the author's set of circumstances, namely the office of the
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; Visiting Professor of Law, American
University, 1996-97. While a Visiting Professor at Marquette University Law School during
the 1995-96 academic year, I presented portions of this article to my colleagues there. They
provided valuable comments and insight, and I wish to thank them. I also wish to thank Dr.
Mary Rowe, ombudsperson at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and noted ombuds
scholar, for her thoughtful and timely comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Dr. Larry
Hill, a well-known ombuds scholar at the University of Oklahoma, also provided insightful
comments, and I am grateful.
I The Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution (now Journal of Dispute Resolution) began
publication in 1984, and the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution began the following
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university ombudsperson, 2 with its strong focus on mediation. This article
proposes that certain features of the classical ombuds office model be
utilized for the challenges which often arise not only within an academic
institution, but also within any large organization or agency.
]]. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Like other academics, I serve on a variety of university committees.
During a recent academic year, my service included membership on both
the faculty governance executive committee and a committee created to
redesign the faculty grievance process. In addition, I chaired a committee
created to address gender and race equity issues on the university campus.
During the year, a variety of issues arose which demanded attention by
at least one of these groups. Disputes often involved misperceptions,
communication breakdowns, failure to understand process and frustration
when a conflict went unresolved. Often a faculty member complained about
an injury inflicted by a colleague: an insult, failure to value one's work, a
racist or sexist remark or insensitivity. At times, the complaint involved the
tenure, promotion or annual evaluation process. The complainant found it
extremely difficult or inefficient to negotiate the procedures demanded by
the faculty handbook, or the injury seemed to call for less drastic action
than the filing of a formal complaint, or the complainant was the only
woman or African-American faculty member in the academic unit and
simply needed emotional support. Sometimes the bureaucratic structure
itself was at fault.
In many instances, the options presented to the complainant seemed
constrained, often inadequate or "superadequate," either an under-reaction
or an over-reaction. I came to realize that the university's formal complaint
process was not always the most effective means to handle the myriad
problems inherent in a bureaucracy like the American university, nor, for
reasons explained below, was mediation always the answer.
I began to explore whether an ombuds office might serve our needs. As
a result of this exploration, I concluded that combining key elements of the
classical ombuds office with the current mediation model within an
organization or agency may yield not only more efficient results, but also
"better" results.
2 Historically, those who served in the ombuds office were male and were titled
.ombudsmen." Therefore, when referring to the historical position, I use the term
"ombudsman." But current ombuds practitioners are both male and female and, at least in this
country, the more appropriate term is "ombudsperson" or "ombuds practitioner."
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H. THE OMBUDS OFFICE
A. Origins
The office of the ombudsman has a long and varied history. In ancient
times, Egyptian kings used complaint officers in their courts. Moses
appointed such officers to respond to the complaints of the Hebrew people.
During the Roman Republic, two censors heard complaints about the
maladministration of those in power and served as watchdogs over
administrative actions. In the Chinese Han Dynasty, the Control Yuan
served the same function.3
The name "ombudsman" derived from practices of medieval Germanic
tribes. In these decentralized, informal governments, only two punishments
were available for convicted law-breakers: (1) they could be declared
"outlaws," thereby permitting anyone to take their lives; or (2) they could
be fined. If they were fined, the wrongdoer's family was expected to pay
the fine to the victim's family. To avoid further conflict between the two
families, a neutral third person was appointed to collect the fine and deliver
it to the victim's family. "Imagine a Viking with homed helmet marching
up to the door of a medieval Nordic hut. The man of the house answers the
call, and then shouts back to his family: 'It's the man about the fine: the
Ombudsman.'- 4 "On" means "about"; 5 "bud" originates from "offering"
or "bribe" 6-one who visits regarding an offering is an ombudsman. Over
time, the word came to refer to any kind of agent. 7
It was not until the eighteenth century that the office was established in
a form recognizable today and not until the nineteenth century that the
office was formally designated "ombudsman." In 1713, the King of Sweden
appointed an officer, the Chancellor of Justice, to investigate complaints
against royal officials.8 In 1809, when Sweden adopted a democratic
constitution, Parliament appointed the Justitieombudsman, 9 a complaints
officer to "supervise the observance of laws and statutes. "1
3 See Gerald E. Caiden et al., The Insfiuion of Ombudsman, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EVOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCTION 9 (Gerald E. Caiden
ed., 1983).
4 STANLEY V. ANDERSON, OMBUDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND
PROoSAs 2 (1969).
5 See d.
6 See THE OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 618 (2d ed. 1989).
7 See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 2. See also Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 10.
8 See F.A. STACEY, OMBUDSMEN COMPARED 1 (1978).
9 See Id.
10 Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 13.
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As envisioned in Sweden in 1809, the ombudsman's role was to serve
as an agent of the government, while at the same time supervising and
prosecuting governmental wrongdoing. In later years, the role became that
of a "citizen-defender, concerned with resolving public complaints against
the public bureaucracy." 1 The complaints might entail illegal acts, but they
could just as likely concern merely unethical or oppressive behavior by
governmental agents against the citizenry. The Swedish Constitution
required the ombudsman to possess "known legal ability and outstanding
integrity."12
In 1919, The Office of Parliamentary Ombudsman, "a person
distinguished in law," was included in Finland's constitution; and Denmark
appointed its first ombudsman, pursuant to statutory law, in 1955.13 The
Danish ombudsman must "keep himself informed as to whether any person
comprised by his jurisdiction pursues unlawful ends, makes arbitrary or
unreasonable decisions or otherwise commits mistakes or acts of negligence
in the discharge of his or her duties."1 4
It is striking that more than one-hundred years passed between the
initial adoption of the ombuds office in Sweden and its adoption in both
Finland and Denmark, particularly in light of its rapid growth in the past
two or three decades. During that initial period, the office experienced
occasional modifications in response to changing times, but the original
foundation and framework remain unchanged to this day. This original,
unique dispute resolution mechanism deserves closer examination.
B. Role of the Classical Ombudsman
As envisioned in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the ombuds office
operates within a governmental structure. The ombudsperson is an "officer
appointed by the legislature to handle complaints against administrative and
judicial action," 15 serving as a watchdog over those actions. The ombuds
office has retained this original function and continues to demonstrate these
original essential characteristics: independence, expertise, impartiality,
accessibility and powers of persuasion rather than control. 16
11 Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 10.
12 Nancy C. Meymand, The Ombudsman: An Extra-Bureaucratic Role 49 (1980)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College).
13 See id. at 53. See also Donald C. Rowat, Finland's Defenders of the Law, in THE
OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA 12, 12 (1973).
14 Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 13.
15 Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman in Sweden, in THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS
ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA 2, 2 (1973).
16 See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 3.
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Professor Larry B. Hill, a well-known expert on the characteristics of
the classical ombuds office, provides the following "defining
characteristics" of the office:
1. legally established,
2. functionally autonomous,
3. external to the administration,






9. client-centered but not anti-administration and
10. both popularly accessible and visible.17
Professor Hill suggests, "[t]he Ombudsman can be thought of as a
cybernetic device for mediating the relationships between the governors and
the governed." 18 In this respect, the ombuds role includes a specialized
form of mediation, which is an essential element of the role's effectiveness.
When adopted by a country's central national government, the
traditional ombuds office is generally provided for in the country's
constitution. The ombudspersons are appointed by one or more branches of
government, yet they maintain independence from all branches of
government. Experts in law or government, ombudspersons serve as
impartial, independent officials, usually of the legislative branch, whose
primary role is to supervise administrative governmental actions. Both
citizens and governmental officials have access to the ombuds office for the
filing of complaints. Ombudspersons have power to investigate complaints,
to issue reports about the complaints and to make recommendations for
resolving the problem. But they have no power to make decisions, to order
administrative officials to do something or to reverse administrative action;
they have power only to make recommendations and to publicize their
findings and recommendations. They seek solutions through the process of
investigation and conciliation. The ombudsperson's "authority and influence
derive from the fact that he is appointed by and reports to one of the
principal organs of state, usually either the parliament or the chief
17 Larry B. Hill, Insdiudonalizadon, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy, 68 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1075, 1077 (1974).
18 LARy B. HILL, THE MODEL OMBUDSMAN: INSTITUTIONALIZINo NEW ZEALAND'S
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 37 (1976).
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executive. "19
Currently, most ombudspersons observe confidentiality in their dealings
with complainants. Although many of them will not accept anonymous
complaints, they do assure complainants that the source of the complaint
will be kept confidential unless the complainant agrees to disclosure of his
or her name. Reports issued by the ombuds office delete the names of
complainants and the governmental officials who are the subject of the
investigation. There are exceptions to this protection in Sweden and
Finland, where the cases are open to the public upon completion. 20
The goals of ombudspersons vary; at the most fundamental level, they
hope both to solve citizen complaints and to improve public administration.
But other goals have been articulated: to (1) "fulfill the latent function of
reinforcing group identity" within a bureaucracy and to promote group
solidarity by "bind[ing] the wounds of a torn academic community"
(referring to a university ombuds office);2 1 (2) to save the time and expense
of litigation and to protect and give "psychological security" to the
citizenry; 22 (3) to provide "new protections against bureaucratic bungling
and abuses of power," serving "as a unique mechanism of democratic
control over bureaucracy"; 23 (4) to serve as an "essential instrument in the
r-' iem administrative state to reduce the gap between the administrators
and the administered" and "to protect basic human rights against possible
infringements by the public bureaucracy. "24
C. Ombudsmania
Since Denmark's adoption of the ombuds office in 1955, countries all
over the world have followed the lead of the three Scandinavian countries
which first adopted this mechanism. In 1962, Norway and New Zealand
established national ombuds offices, followed by Australia (one state),
Austria, Canada (seven provinces), Fiji, France, Ghana, Guyana, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
19 Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 13. See also Paul R. Verkuil, 7he Ombudsman and the
Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 847 (1975).
20 See Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 14.
21 Meymand, supra note 12, at 19-20.
2 2 See William B. Gwyn, Transferring the Ombudsman, in OMBUDSMEN FOR AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT? 37, 41-42 (Stanley V. Anderson ed., 1968).
23 DONALD C. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD
OF AN IDEA at vii-viii (1973).
24 Gerald E. Caiden, Introduction to CAIDEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
THE OMBUDSMAN: EVOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCTION at xvii (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983).
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Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and others. 25 In
some countries, ombuds offices have jurisdiction only in large cities or only
over certain governmental agencies. For example, in 1957 West Germany
established an ombuds office for its armed forces. In Israel, a "state
comptroller" eventually adopted an ombuds role, supplementing that
country's appointment of a military ombudsman and Jerusalem's city
ombudsman. In Switzerland, Zurich established an ombuds office in 1969. 26
By 1973, twenty-one countries had established ombuds offices or variations
on the office. The concept also reached the United States and began to make
its way into new and unforeseen areas such as nongovernmental offices and
universities. 27 The rapid and widespread growth in ombuds offices from the
1950s until the 1980s prompted some observers to note that this period
represented a "surge of ombudsmania."28
As a result of its rapid growth, the ombuds office necessarily took on
different characteristics, depending upon the needs and circumstances of the
place and time. As developed in Sweden, the office is legislative rather than
executive. All political parties must agree on the appointment of a particular
ombudsperson, who then holds the office for four years but may serve
additional four-year terms. The ombudsperson reports to the legislature.
However, she is an impartial investigator and is politically independent,
even from the legislature, and legislators are forbidden from intervening in
the ombudsperson's investigations. The office is constitutionally
established. Although the ombudsperson has no power to reverse or change
an official act, she has tremendous influence in Sweden by virtue of her
"objectivity, competence, superior knowledge and prestige."29 The
ombudsperson can begin an investigation based on citizen complaint or can
act on her own initiative. In either event, the results of the investigation can
be made known both to the legislature and to the press. The ombudsperson
has authority to prosecute officials for illegal acts, although this power is
rarely exercised.3 0
Many citizen complaints in Sweden are resolved in this manner,
including complaints from prison inmates or patients in mental hospitals.
The process begins when the ombudsperson receives a letter from a
25 See Peter J. Bayne & Jqlle A.M. Dawson, The States, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
OF THE OMBUDSMAN: COUNTRY SURVEYS 7, 7-11 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983); ROWAT,
supra note 23, at vii; DONALD C. ROWAT, THE SPREAD OF THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN IN
WESTERN EUROPE (International Ombudsman Institute Occasional Paper 21, 1983).
2 6 See ROWAT, supra note 23, at vii.
27 See id. at viii.
28 Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 5.
2 9 Rowat, supra note 15, at 4.
30 See j&
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complainant; in some cases, however, the ombudsperson can begin an
investigation based solely upon information received from other sources,
such as a story in the media. The ombuds office might find that the
complaint has no merit and dismiss it. But if the complaint has merit, the
ombuds office can recommend action.
When this basic process is transferred to other countries, it necessarily
undergoes modification because of the differing legal systems and cultures.
In the United Kingdom, a number of incidents necessitated the creation of
an ombuds office, but scholars cite one incident in particular: the Crichel
Down affair. This incident involved the taking of a citizen's land for
military use with the proviso that, after the military use had ended, the
owner would have an opportunity to regain his land. When the land was
released, however, the owner was not given the promised opportunity.
There were allegations of misbehavior by civil servants, and a minister
eventually resigned. No laws had been broken, yet the result seemed unjust
and sparked widespread outrage. The incident demonstrated procedural
inadequacy and contributed significantly to the creation of the ombuds
office.31
Unlike the Scandinavian model, in the United Kingdom the
governmental ombuds office can act only in response to an individual's
complaint. Citizens cannot directly gain access to the ombuds office but
must instead contact a member of Parliament. 32 But the essential
components have remained remarkably similar to the first ombuds office
established in Sweden in the nineteenth century.
D. The Ombuds Office in the United States
Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic about the ombuds office in
this country has been its growth. Today, the United States has more
ombudspersons than anywhere else in the world.33 It is estimated that
several hundred ombudspersons work in American and Canadian academic
institutions and many more in public agencies and private organizations. 34
3 1 See Baroness B. Serota, The Evolution of the Role of the Ombudsman-Comparisons
and Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EVOLUTION AND
PRESENT FUNCTION 27, 27-28 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983). See also Larry B. Hill, The
Transference of the Institution of Ombudsman, with Special Reference to Britain (1966)
(unpublished M. Pol. Sci. thesis, Tulane University).
32 See Serota, supra note 31, at 29.
33 See CAROLYN STEBER, VARIATION ON A CLASSICAL THEME: THE ACADEMIC
OMBUDSMAN IN THE UNITED STATES (International Ombudsman Institute Occasional Paper
38, 1987).
34 See Mary P. Rowe, Options, Functions, and Skills: RWat an Organizational
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For example:
Three dozen newspapers have an ombudsman. Nearly 4,000 hospitals
have patient ombuds offices and a great many businesses have client or
consumer complaint offices. Each state has a nursing homellong-term care
ombuds structure, and there appear to be about 1,500 part-time and full-
time ombudspeople attached to those offices. 35
Another remarkable characteristic is how this dispute resolution
mechanism has undergone substantial changes in the transfer. Today's
American ombudsperson may bear a substantial resemblance to the classical
Swedish model-or it may bear almost none. It is fair to say that few, if
any, of the American ombuds offices fit the classical model perfectly.
Much of the credit for importing the ombuds model into this country
must go to two scholars. Professor Donald C. Rowat suggested its use as
early as 196236 and Professor Walter Gellhom published two books about
the model just four years later.37 This latter development received national
attention when Time published an article describing the ombuds concept and
noting the publication of Gellhorn's two books.38 The article asked, "What
champion can fight city hall, slash red tape and rescue the Little Guy from
the insolence of Big Bureaucracy" 39 The answer: the ombudsman.
In the 1960s, American interest in the classical ombuds office grew by
leaps and bounds. Bills were introduced in both the national and state
legislatures which would have established ombuds or ombuds-like offices in
the federal and state governments. Ralph Naier introduced a Connecticut
ombuds bill in 1963, 40 the same year in which Congressman Henry Reuss
filed a similar bill in the House of Representatives. 41 Senator Long
Ombudsman Might Want to Know, II NEGOTIATION J. 103, 113 n.2 (1995).
3 5 Mary P. Rowe, The Corporat Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3
NEGOTIATION J. 127, 139 (1987).
3 6 See generally Donald C. Rowat, The Pariamentary Ombudsman: Should the
Scandinavian Scheme Be Transplanted?, 28 INT'L REV. OF THE ADMIN. Sci. 399 (1962).
37 See generally WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS'
PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIEs (1966); WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN:
GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PRocEDUREs (1966).
3 8 See The People's Watchdog, TIME, Dec. 2, 1966, at 58, 60.
3 9 Id. at 58.
40 See HILL, supra note 18, at 9.
41 See Donald C. Rowat, The Relevance of the Plan to the USA and Canada, in THE
OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA 68, 75 n.1 (1973)
(Reuss' bill was numbered H.R. 7593 and called for the establishment of an "administrative
counsel"). Reuss introduced similar legislation in 1967, renaming the position a
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sponsored legislation in the Senate in 1967,42 and in 1971 Senator Javits,
joined by four other Senators and Representatives Steiger and Reuss,
introduced similar bills in both the Senate and House.43 As envisioned by
their drafters, federal legislative proposals would have relieved
Congressional members of some of the burden of handling constituent
complaints.44 None of these bills passed.
But failure on the national level did not deter local efforts. The first
ombudsperson in North America was established in Nassau County, New
York, in 1966 and was called a "Public Protector." Professor Walter
Gellhorn drafted an annotated model ombudsman statute and the Yale
Legislative Services collaborated with the American Bar Association to
produce a Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments. Less than ten
years after Time published its first article about the ombuds office,
legislation had been- introduced in all but eight states to implement the
ombuds model in some fashion.45 "Ombudsmania" had caught on in the
United States.
The legal system took note. In 1969, the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution which approved the use of ombuds offices for state and
local governments and suggested experimentation at the federal level. 46 Two
years later, a newly formed "Ombudsman Committee" of the A.B.A.'s
Administrative Law Section issued a Development Report, noting
"continued growth" in ombuds offices worldwide. The Committee also
noted that colleges and universities in the United States had begun to
establish such offices and reported that at least thirty-eight institutions had
ombudspersons. 47
.congressional ombudsman." Donald C. Rowat, Recent Developments in the USA, in THE
OMBUDSMAN PLAN: ESSAYS ON THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF AN IDEA 76 (1973) [hereinafter
Rowat, Recent Developments].
4 2 See Rowat, Recent Developments, supra note 41, at 78. The bill was introduced was
S. 1195. See id.
43 See id. at 80. S. 2200 and H.R. 9562, known as the Administrative Ombudsman
Experimentation Act, called for demonstration projects in three regions. The ombudsperson
would be appointed by the House Speaker and Senate President after consultation with the
majority and minority leaders. See id.
44 See Henry S. Reuss & Everard Munsey, 7he United States, in THE OMBUDSMAN:
CITIZEN'S DEFENDER 194, 195-196 (Donald C. Rowat ed., 2d ed. 1968).
4 5 See HILL, supra note 18, at 11.
46 See Rowat, Recent Developments, supra note 41, at 79.
4 7 See Ombudsman Committee, Development Report, 1971-1972 A.B.A. SEC. OF
ADMIN. L. 1, 16.
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In 1967, Hawaii became the first state to establish an ombuds office,
which continues to this day.48 Iowa and Nebraska followed suit the same
year, and Alaska followed six years later. In f995, the Arizona legislature
established the Office of Ombudsman-Citizens Aide. 49 At the same time,
local governments had begun to investigate this innovative dispute
resolution and avoidance device. The following cities and counties were
among those who established ombuds or ombuds-like offices: Anchorage,
Alaska; Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; Fayette County,
Kentucky (Lexington); Flint, Michigan; Jackson County, Missouri (Kansas
City); Jamestown, New York; King County, Washington (Seattle);
Montgomery County, Ohio (Dayton); New York City; and Wichita,
Kansas. Puerto Rico and Guam also established offices. By 1980, some
aspect of the ombuds model had been adopted in varying degrees by twenty-
five states. 50
All of these offices shared some characteristics with the classic
Scandinavian model, particularly in that they were governmental offices
established to intercede between the government and its constituencies. But
in the process of transferring the original national model to county and
municipal offices, many changes took place. Local control often meant local
responses to particularized needs, even though this response necessitated
divergence from the classic ombuds model. For example, in 1995 in one
state alone, legislation provided that ombudspersons be hired in areas
relating to long term care, nursing homes, workers compensation,
institutions and facilities for the mentally retarded and for the
developmentally disabled, small businesses and minority businesses.5 1
4 8 See Paul Dolan, 7he Ombudsman in the United States: The States, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: COUNTRY SURVEYs 217, 218 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983).
See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1993).
4 9 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1371 to 41-2998.22 (1995). See also ALASKA STAT. §§
24.55.010 to 24.55.340 (1995); IOWA CODE §§ 2C.1 to 2C.23 (1995) (here called the
"Citizens' Aide"); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,240 to 81-8,254 (1994) (here called the "Public
Counsel").
5 0 See Dolan, supra note 48, at 218. See also ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATEs, THE OMBUDSMAN: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENcIES 3 (1991).
51 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1415.1 (West 1995) (mentally retarded); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27A § 2-5-115 (West 1995) (state Air Quality Ombuds Office for Small
Businesses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-818.27 ZWest 1995) (developmentally disabled or
physically handicapped); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 1-2211 to 1-2216 (West 1995) (Long-
Term Care Ombudsman Act); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-1816 (West 1995) (State Ombuds
Office for Small Businesses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-1902 (West 1995) (nursing
homes); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 § 5010.3 (West 1995) (minority and disadvantaged
business entrepreneurs); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85 § 3.9 (West 1995) (Workers'
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Another state included ombudspersons for health service agencies, small
business air quality compliance assistance, state department of corrections,
mental health agencies, older citizens, families and crime victims.
52
These modified versions have been termed quasi-ombudsmen-
"complaints officials [who] shar[e] many of the classical ombudsman's
characteristics but lack... at least one structural feature considered
fundamental to the institution." 53 In the United States, a quasi-ombuds
office often lacks independence because it is too closely affiliated with a
governmental supervisory official, such as a mayor or governor.54 As a
result, ombuds purists believe there are "few bona fide ombudsmen
operating in the United States" today. 55 The five state ombuds offices most
closely resemble the classical model.
For example, in Hawaii, the ombudsperson has many of the broad-
ranging powers traditionally allocated to the classical ombuds model. "The
ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the administrative acts of [state]
agencies," 56 but his jurisdiction does not include the judiciary, legislature,
governor, lieutenant governor or county mayors or councils. 57 He is
appointed by the legislature for a term of six years, up to a maximum of
three terms, and can be removed prior to expiration of the term only by a
two-thirds vote and only for neglect of duty, misconduct or disability. His
salary may not be diminished while in office. 58 This framework provides
the ombuds office with substantial independence from political vicissitude.
The Hawaii ombudsman "may investigate any complaint which the
ombudsman determines to be an appropriate subject for investigation" and
"may investigate on the ombudsman's own motion," if he believes it
necessary. 59 Examples of appropriate subjects for investigation include
administrative acts which are "[p]erformed in an inefficient manner" or are
"[u]nreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or unnecessarily discriminatory, even
though in accordance with law." 6° This aspect of the ombuds office closely
resembles the office as it exists in the Scandinavian countries.
Compensation assistance).
52 See MINN. STAT. §§ 62Q.32, 116.98, 241.41, 245.91, 256.974, 257.0755, 611A.72
(1995).
51 Larry B. Hill, The Citizen Participation-Representation Roles of American
Ombudsmen, 13 ADMIN. & Soc'y 405, 408 (1982).
54 See id.
55 Dolan, supra note 48, at 217.
56 HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-5 (1993).
57 See HAW. Rv. STAT. § 96-1 (1993).
58 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-2 (1993).
59 HAW. RLv. STAT. § 96-6 (1993).
6) HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-8 (1993).
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The ombudsman has the power to "make inquiries and obtain
information as the ombudsman thinks fit, enter without notice to inspect the
premises of any agency, and hold private hearings." 61 He may "[c]ompel
... by a subpoena, the appearance and sworn testimony of any person"
who might have relevant information; "[c]ompel any person to produce
documents, papers, or objects"; and "bring suit in an appropriate state court
to enforce these powers." 62 "The ombudsman is required to maintain
secrecy in respect to all matters and the identities of the complainants or
witnesses coming before [him] except so far as disclosures may be necessary
to enable the ombudsman to carry out the ombudsman's duties and to
support the ombudsman's recommendations."6
After the investigation, the ombudsman "shall report" his opinion and
recommendations to the agency if he finds any of the following: (1) The
agency should consider the matter further; (2) The "administrative act
should be modified or cancelled"; (3) "A statute or regulation... should be
altered"; (4) "Reasons should be given for an administrative act"; or
(5)"Any other action should be taken by the agency. " 64
Like the classical ombudsmen, the Hawaii "ombudsman may present
[his] opinion and recommendations to the governor, the legislature, the
public, or any of these." 65 He receives immunity from judicial action. 66
Both Alaska's and Nebraska's ombuds statutes are very similar to that
of Hawaii, except that Nebraska designates this position as "public
counsel."67 Iowa's ombuds office,* however, has less autonomy and power
by virtue of the fact that the ombudsperson (designated a "citizens' aide")
holds office for just four years and "may at any time be removed from
office by constitutional majority vote of the two houses of the general
assembly."68 Furthermore, both the governor and general assembly "may
require disclosure of any matter and shall have complete access to the
records and files of the citizens' aide." 69 The citizens' aide is forbidden
from investigating an agency employee's complaint regarding his
employment with the agency. 70
61 HAw. REv. STAT. § 96-9 (1993).
62 RAW. REv. STAT. § 96-10 (1993).
63 HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-9 (1993).
64 HAW. REv. STAT. § 96-12 (1993).
65 RAW. REv. STAT. § 96-13 (1993).
66 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 96-17 (1993).
67 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.55.010 to 24.55.340 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 81-8,240
to 81-8,254 (1994).
68 IOWA CODE § 2C.5 (1995).
69 IOWA CODE § 2C.8 (1995).
70 See IOWA CODE § 2C.9 (1995).
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Arizona's legislation creating the Office of Ombudsman-Citizens Aide
became effective July 1, 1996,71 and exempts elected state officials and
legislative staff.72 The ombudsman-citizens aide is selected by a committee
consisting of state senate and house members of each party; representatives
of large business, small business and consumer groups; and state
employees. 73 The ombudsman-citizens aide serves for five years, may serve
up to three terms and may be removed only by a two-thirds senate and
house vote, "but only for neglect of duty, conviction of improperly
divulging confidential information, misconduct or disability." 74 Powers and
duties of the Arizona ombudsman-citizens aide are similar to those of the
Hawaii office.75 Arizona ombudsmen receive qualified immunity from civil
suits and "shall not be required to testify in court regarding matters that
come to their attention in the exercise of their duties except as may be
necessary to enforce" the statute.76 Presumably to facilitate autonomy,
"[t]he office of ombudsman-citizens aide shall not be located within the
state office building complex or adjacent or contiguous to any other state
agency. "77
Thus, at least four of the five state models demonstrate a close alliance
with the classical model of the ombuds office. The ombudsperson serves as
an agent of government, supervising and prosecuting wrongdoing. He
protects the citizenry against arbitrary or unreasonable governmental agency
actions, even though such actions may be legal. The essential characteristics
of an ombuds office are present to varying degrees: independence,
expertise, impartiality, accessibility and powers of persuasion rather than
control. But all of the state models exempt the actions of key elected
officials, and four of them exempt the courts, from the ombuds'
investigative power. Although legally established, it cannot be said that
these offices are truly external to the administration of state governments,
but they represent an excellent effort to serve as governmental watchdogs.
Although no other states have adopted the ombuds model to the same
degree as these five states, the ombuds idea filtered down to particular
subsets of state government. In response to disputes between prisoners and
prison officials, the prison ombuds office was created. Nursing homes,
prompted by the Older Americans Act of 1965,78 also began to try this new
71 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1371 (Supp. 1995).
72 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414372 (Supp. 1995).
73 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1373 (Supp. 1995).
74 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1375 (Supp. 1995).
75 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1376 to 41-1379 (Supp. 1995).
76 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1380 (Supp. 1995).
77 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1382 (Supp. 1995).
78 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001 to 3058ee (1995). Certain federal funding of state long-term
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device, hoping in the process to defuse discontent and dissatisfaction before
major problems erupted. This localized focus, although resulting in
divergence from the classical model, created a powerful new ombuds model
which offers many advantages over the traditional focus on litigation.
Private and public workplaces also began to adopt the ombuds model in
response to changing times. The 1960s and 1970s experienced increased
complexity in both private and public business worlds. Diversity created by
the entrance of racial minorities and women into positions traditionally held
by white men, changes in employment law, governmental regulation of
workplace safety, judicial constraints on employment at-will practices and
other changes in the workplace led public agencies and private enterprises to
attempt to devise methods of resolving the growing number of internal
workplace conflicts. At the same time, consumers' complaints became more
demanding, and manufacturers and retailers began to search for ways to
settle these external disputes quickly, cheaply and quietly.
Such organizations experimented with various conflict resolution
devices and, in many cases, ended up with an ombuds-like office without
any awareness that such a model existed elsewhere. Organizations nationally
"reinvented the wheel" over and over, learning only later that others had
adopted similar devices. In some cases, only after the fact were such devices
labeled "ombuds" offices. 79
Today, hundreds of corporations and agencies have ombuds or ombuds-
like offices for the settlement of both internal and external disputes,
including McDonald's, Federal Express, AT&T, the IRS and Bank of
America.80 For the most part, these ombudspersons lack the independence
of the classic ombudsman because they are hired by and report directly to
top management. They often serve primarily as mediators and
organizational trouble-shooters. They conduct informal in-house
investigations and examine documents and data. Many conduct an "early
neutral evaluation" to determine whether further action is required for a
particular issue. They may recommend organizational changes. They are
care programs was conditioned on the establishment of state long-term care ombudsmen. See
42 U.S.C. § 3058g (1995).
7 9 Telephone Interview with Mary P. Rowe, Ombudsperson at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Apr. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Rowe Interview].
8 0 See LINDA R. SINGER, SETrLNa DISPUTES: CoNFuCr RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FA]mSUE, AND THE LEoAL SYsTEM 103 (1991); Victor Futter, An Answer to the Public
Perception of Corporations: A Corporate Ombudsperson?, 46 Bus. LAW. 29, 41 (1990).
Early on, Isidore Silver adapted the ombuds concept to organizations and paved the way
for the rapid increase in the number of organizational ombuds offices. See Isidore Silver, The
Corporate Ombudsman, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1967, at 77 (arguing that the institution
of the ombudsman could easily be applied to corporations).
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called by different names--complaints officer, liaison or ombudsperson,
among others--but the term "ombudsperson" or "ombuds practitioner" is
becoming more widely used in the 1990s.8 1 They represent a fast-growing
profession, currently numbering about 8,000 "ombudsman-like practitioners
in North America. "8 2
The federal government has also retained interest in the ombuds office.
In June 1990, the Administrative Conference of the United States
"recommended that all government agencies that interact frequently with the
public consider establishing an ombudsman service to deal with grievances
from the public."83 The recommendation resulted in a publication entitled
The Ombudsman: A Primer for Federal Agencies.84
Some state and federal agencies also have in place inspector general
offices, which serve some of the functions of the classic ombuds office. For
example, Florida's executive branch includes the Office of Chief Inspector
General, who is "responsible for promoting accountability, integrity, and
efficiency in the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor." 8 5 The
Inspector General has power to "[ilitiate, supervise, and coordinate
investigations, recommend policies, and carry out other activities designed
to deter, detect, prevent, and eradicate fraud, waste, abuse,
mismanagement, and misconduct in government." 86 Like the classic
ombudsman, the Chief Inspector General has power to investigate agency
81 See Rowe Interview, supra note 79. See also STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, Standard 6
(The Ombudsman Association) ("Formal investigations-for the purpose of adjudication-
should be done by others. In the event thaf an ombudsman accepts a request to conduct a
formal investigation, a memo should be written to file noting this action as an exception to the
ombudsman role.").
82 JAMES T. ZIEGENFUSS, JR., ORGANIZATIONAL TROUBLESHOOTERS: RESOLVING
PROBLEMS wrrTH CUSTOMERS AND EMPLOYEES xii (1988). The organizational ombudsperson
may serve different clientele. The "client" ombudsperson serves as an intermediary between
the organization and its clients: McDonald's and its customers, for example. The "internal"
ombudsperson serves as an intermediary between the organizational managers and its
employees, or between co-employees. Some ombudspersons serve both functions. For
example, a university ombudsperson may attempt to resolve disputes between students and the
university ("client" ombudsperson) or between two employees or an employee and her boss
("internal" ombudsperson). See Rowe Interview, supra note 79.
83 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE OMBUDSMAN: A
PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES 1, 3 (1991). The Administrative Conference was established
in 1964 "to promote improvement in the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of procedures by
which federal agencies conduct" their business. Id. at inside cover.
84 See id.
85 FLA. STAT. ch. 14.32(l) (1996).
86 FLA. STAT. ch. 14.32(2)(a) (1996).
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actions, to examine their records and "to receive complaints... concerning
the possible violation of law or administrative rules... abuse of authority,
[or] malfeasance." 87 But the Chief Inspector General is "appointed by and
serve[s] at the pleasure of the Governor, '"88 suggesting a significant lack of
independence.8
9
The federal government includes many inspectors general, pursuant to
the Inspector General Act of 1978. 90 The purpose of this Act is to create
"independent and objective units... to conduct and supervise audits and
investigations" of federal agencies. 91 The inspectors general conduct both
financial and performance audits, reporting the results to both the agency
heads and Congress. 92 These offices specialize in investigating and
reporting, assuming in many respects a prosecutorial role. What they lack is
the crucial mediation function which many ombuds offices currently view as
their strength. Furthermore, critics have asserted that the inspector general
investigations and audits "focus too much on small problems at the expense
of larger systemic issues. "93
Other governmental offices have developed which serve in some
respects the same functions as the ombuds office. For example, in
California the commonlaw grand jury developed "as an instrument against
despotism. " 94 Although it "operates as part of the judicial branch of
government, it obviously represents the people and not the judiciary insofar
as its investigative and reporting powers are concerned." 95 It represents the
people's "right to know about the workings of their state and local
government including the activities of public officials in the performance of
their official duties. " 96 In these respects, the role of the California
87 FLA. STAT. ch. 14.32(2) (1996).
88 FLA. STAT. ch. 14.32(1) (1996).
89 The District of Columbia also utilizes an Office of the Inspector General, but its focus
appears to be on financial accountability, rather than on governmental conduct generally. See
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1182.8 (1992).
90 See 5 U.S.C.S. app. § 3 (Lawyers' Co-op. 1987).
91 5 U.S.C.S. app. § 2 (Lawyers' Co-op. 1987).
92 See 5 U.S.C.S. app. §§ 2, 4(a)(5), 5 (Lawyers' Co-op. 1987).
93 William S. Fields, The Enigma of Bureaucradc Accountability, 43 CATH. U.L. REV.
505, 517 (1994) (reviewing PAUL C. LOHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT-INsPECrORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR AccOuNTABmTY (1993)).
94 McClatchy Newspapers v. The Superior Court of Fresno County, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598,
604 (1985), revd on other grounds, 751 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1988) (citing Richard H. Kuh, The
Grand Jury 'Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1109-1110
(1955)).
9 5 McC~archy Newspapers, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
96 Id.
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commonlaw grand jury bears a striking resemblance to that of the classical
ombuds office. But as with inspectors general, mediation is not included in
the grand jury's function.
IV. CLASSICAL OMBUDSPtRSONS V. QUASI-OMBUDSPERSONS
It is clear that in the past twenty-five years, the United States has
embraced the ombuds idea. But before undertaking a closer examination of
the university ombuds office, it might be helpful to review the various paths
which the ombuds model has taken.
A. Classical Ombuds Offices
The classical ombuds office is the model which originated in the
Scandinavian countries and is discussed earlier in this article. The office is
established and maintained pursuant to constitutional or statutory directive.
The ombudsperson is appointed by the legislature to serve as watchdog over
governmental administrative and judicial actions. She maintains
independence from all branches of government, investigates complaints,
issues reports and recommends action. Investigation and mediation are
integral functions of this office, as is public accountability. The five state
ombuds offices in this country most closely resemble the classical model,
although county or city ombuds offices might also have many of the
classical ombuds characteristics.
B. Quasi-Ombuds Offices
Quasi-ombuds offices "shar[e] many of the classical ombudsman's
characteristics but lack[] at least one structural feature considered
fundamental to the institution. Most commonly, their independence is
compromised in some fashion." 97
1. Governmental Ombuds Offices Created by Law
A host of ombuds offices have been created by statute or ordinance to
serve as governmental watchdogs or liaisons between the citizenry and
government. These include county or city ombudspersons, prison
ombudspersons and state and local agency ombudspersons. Although these
may include the key characteristics of the classical ombuds model, more
97 Hill, supra note 53, at 408. Many of these quasi-ombudsmen, Professor Hill asserts,
are "executive" ombudsmen who "come under the hierarchical authority of such officials as
the governor, mayor, or city manager." Id.
[Vol. 12:1 1996]
SUPPLANTING MEDIATION WITH THE OMBUDS MODEL
likely they lack at least one fundamental structural feature of that model and
must therefore be deemed "quasi" ombuds offices.
2. Organizational Ombuds Offices
Organizational ombuds offices lack several fundamental structural
features of the classical model and are therefore "quasi" ombuds offices.
Although they may exist in either public or private organizations, they are
established without constitutional or statutory authority. They are created
not through legislative action but through voluntary administrative action.
Their creation, as well as their continuing viability, is not grounded in law.
Thus, their independence is more easily compromised than that of the
classical ombudsperson. In many cases, the opportunity for public
accountability may also be lacking. The organizational ombudsperson
generally conducts no formal investigation, issues no written reports and
eschews publicity. She relies most heavily on mediation to resolve disputes.
Organizational ombuds offices are of two types: internal and external.
Internal ombuds offices attempt to resolve disputes within the organization,
between employees or between employees and management. External
ombuds offices attempt to resolve disputes between the organization and its
constituency or clientele. Some ombuds offices do both.
C. he University Ombuds Office
Along with the growing number of organizational ombuds offices
which have developed as dispute resolution mechanisms, American
universities signed on in the turbulent 1960s. Faced with an increasingly
active, noisy and discontented student body, Michigan State University in
1966 became the first major educational institution to turn to the ombuds
office as a potential dispute resolution mechanism. 98 The following year,
the State University of New York in Stony Brook appointed three professors
to serve as an ombuds committee to hear student and faculty complaints,
and that same year the University of California at Berkeley selected a
professor to serve one-half time as ombudsperson for student complaints."
An event which led to significant discussion of university
ombudspersons, however, occurred after the shooting of students by the
98 See Meymand, supra note 12, at 95. The first campus ombudsman at any American
college or university may have been at Eastern Montana College, Billings, during the 1966-
1967 academic year. See Kenneth L. Stewart, What a University Ombudsman Does: A
Sociological Study of Everyday Conduct, 49 J. HIGHER ED. 1, 1 (1978).
99 See THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZENS' DEFENDER xv (Donald C. Rowat ed., 2d ed.
1968).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
National Guard at Kent State University in 1970. The President's
Commission on Campus Unrest was formed in response to that tragedy and
to a similar event at Jackson State College. It issued a report in 1970 which
described several dispute resolution mechanisms in place at universities,
including the ombudsman. The ombudsman was described as
An individual who acts as a mediator and fact-finder for students, faculty
members, and administrators. To be successful, the ombudsman must
have both great autonomy and the support of the university president. He
must not be penalized by the college administration if his findings and
recommendations embarrass university leaders. 100
The Commission urged the use of mediation to resolve disputes.
The following year, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
issued a report which included a number of recommendations including the
appointment of
an individual or agency to inform members of the campus of the
appropriate agency to hear their individual complaints and suggestions,
and to assist them in being heard; ombudsmen or hearing committees
composed of faculty, students, and administrators can serve this function.
When the complaints are responded to, both the response and the rationale
behind it should be made widely known. 1° 1
The report further suggested "the use of both ombudsmen and hearing
officers," the ombudsman to be used to respond informally to faculty,
student and administrator complaints, and the hearing officer to formally
investigate and resolve disputes. "The ombudsman [chosen by a committee
consisting of faculty, students and administrators] would independently
attempt to resolve both academic and nonacademic grievances, as well as
help individuals to use existing avenues for redress of grievances." 102
This report demonstrates an awareness of some of the key elements of
the classic ombuds office: independence, expertise, impartiality,
accessibility and powers of persuasion rather than control. But it focuses
less on the citizen-defender role of the classical ombudsman and more on
the role of peacemaker or dispute resolver, evident by its advocating some
form of mediation or counseling and assistance in negotiating formal
mechanisms already in place. Like other ombuds offices worldwide, it
10 0 THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPUS UNREST 205 (1970).
101 THE CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, DISSENT AND DISRUPTION:
PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CAwUs 64 (1971).
102Id. at 97.
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represents one path to resolution of disputes, leaving open other formal
proceedings. Although the differences seem great to some,103 others have
argued that the university ombuds office closely resembles the classical
model. 104
The concept of university ombuds offices quickly caught on. By 1971,
approximately sixty-five campuses had ombuds offices in some form,
including seventeen in California alone. 10 5 By June 1982, over one-hundred
colleges and universities had such offices. 1°6 Today, the University and
College Ombuds Association has 137 members practicing at nearly one-
hundred academic institutions in the United States. 10 7
What do these university ombuds offices look like? Are they effective?
What are their goals? The answers to these, questions vary significantly,
reflecting the widespread confusion about this ADR mechanism.
For example, at Michigan State University, the first major university to
establish an ombuds office, the ombudsperson is a senior faculty member
who serves only students and follows a "nondirective" model.10 8 This
model takes three forms: detached investigator, enabler-facilitator and
1 03 See, e.g., Larry B. Hill, Ombudsman, in 8 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW:
EVERYONE'S LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 82-83 (1984); Louis G. STAMATAKOS & OLAF ISACHSEN,
TOWARDS MAKING THE UNIVERSITY OMBUDSMAN A MORE EFFECTIVE FORCE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: A CoMPARATIvE STUDY 193 (1970).
104 See, e.g., Stieber, supra note 33, at 1. Stieber examines ombudsman scholar
Professor Larry Hill's directive and nondirective models of the ombuds office and finds that
his nondirective model fits academia well. That model includes the detached investigator and
enabler-facilitator, and includes referral to other persons or entities. The directive model,
which includes a decision-making arbitrator, does not fit academia as well, Stieber suggests.
Id. at 4-6.
1 05 See Ralph Poblano, Campus Ombudsmen in California Universities and State
Colleges, 52 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 580, 580 (1971).
106 See Carolyn Stieber, Resolvng Campus Disputes: Notes of a University Ombudsman,
ARB. J., June 1982, at 5, 6. The authors of a 1972 article stated that at that time there were
more than 190 college and university ombudsmen. See William T. Keating & James A.
Holden, The Campus Ombudsman: A Vehicle for Change?, 6 1. RES. & DEV. IN EDUC. 38,
41 (1972). See also A. CLARE BUE CHANEY, How TO ESTABLISH A CAMPUS OMBUDSMAN
13-14 (1982).
1 07 See Electronic mail from Richard Hebein, President, University and College
Ombuds Association, to Shirley Wiegand, Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma (Feb.
19, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Richard Hebein].
108 See Stieber, supra note 33, at 4-6. Stieber bases her descriptions on the work of
Professor Larry B. Hill, who has written prolifically about the ombuds concept. In her article,
Stieber describes her role as Michigan State University's ombudsperson, a role she assumed in
1974. See id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
broker-negotiator.1° 9 One long-time ombudsperson at Michigan State 10
considers the "directive" model--emphasizing the roles of arbitrator,
advocate and political activistlll--inappropriate for the academic ombuds
office.
At the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), the ombuds office
began in 1986 and is open to the Caltech community, including its
employees. 112 Caltech assures those who utilize the ombuds services that
"'[tihe Ombudsperson does not take sides, but considers the rights and
interests of all parties involved in a dispute, with the aim of achieving a fair
outcome. The Ombudsperson does not arbitrate, adjudicate, or participate in
the formal grievance process.'" 113 The "office is independent of all
[Caltech] structures, while reporting to the Provost's Office on
administrative and budgetary matters only."114
The two ombudspersons at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) 1 15 function in a system which is "mediation-oriented." 116 They serve
students and all non-union employees, including faculty and managers." 7
They represent but one option of several in a multi-faceted dispute
resolution system which focuses on "communications, counseling, fact-
finding, conciliation, and mediation, with adjjidication where necessary." 118
These "quasi-ombuds" practitioners 19  or "organizational
ombudspersons,"' 20 differ from the classical model ombudspersons in that
109 See Id. at 3-4. These descriptions were utilized in an ombuds survey during 1975-
1977. See Larry B. Hill, The Self-Perceptions of Ombudsmen: A Comparative Survey, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EvoLUTIoN AND PRESENT FUNCTION 43,
50 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983).
110 This ombudsman responded to an ombuds survey during 1975-1977.
111 See Hill, supra note 109.
112 See Garstang v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 89
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (involving the discovery of communications disclosed to the university
ombudsperson).
113 Id. at 89 n.5 (citation omitted).
114 Id.
115 Ombudspersons at MIT were initially called "Special Assistants to the President."
See Mary P. Rowe, The Non-Union ComplaintSystem at MIT: An Upward-Feedback Model, 2
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF Lmo., Apr. 1984, at 10, reprinted in LEONARD L.
RiSKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 392 (1987).
116 See id. at 392.
117 See id.
118 Rowe, supra note 115, at 392.
119 See Hill, supra note 53, at 408.
120 For a definition of "quasi-ombudsperson," see supra text accompanying note 97.
See also Rowe, supra note 34, at 103, wherein Dr. Rowe, ombudsperson at MIT for the past
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they do not conduct formal investigations nor do they write or publicize
case reports. 12 1 "Their purpose is to foster values and decent behavior-
fairness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity, and respect." 122 Although
they favor neither the institution nor the complainant, they believe that "the
institution has a common interest with people who have been wronged." 123
Ordinarily they do not initiate investigations, taking only those disputes
presented to them by complainants; however, they have authority to act on
their own initiative as well."2 The MIT ombudspersons provide "upward
feedback" to line managers (i.e., provide them with "data... which would
be useful to managers to run their areas effectively and humanely") at the
same time preserving the confidentiality and privacy of the parties involved
in an individual dispute. 125
An ombudsperson at the University of Texas in the 1980s saw her
"central responsibility" as representing "the individual-not necessarily as
an advocate but as a neutral problem solver-in a complex bureaucracy." 12
6
In a 1974 article, the University of Kentucky's ombudsperson described his
role as mediator of faculty-student disputes. He served a one-year term and
was chosen from the faculty by a committee composed of two faculty
members, three students and one administrative representative. 127
The ombuds office at the University of Alberta attempted to serve
faculty, staff and students. That effort failed, perhaps because both faculty
and staff already had "well-developed grievance processes." 12 1 But, as of
1983, the ombuds offices at the University of California campuses at Los
Angeles, Riverside and Santa Barbara all served students, faculty and staff.
Berkeley served only students and San Diego only staff. Most of the
campuses in that state focused on student complaints, and the ombuds
23 years, draws a distinction between the classical ombuds office and the "organizational
ombudsperson," who is "a confidential and informal information resource, communications
channel, complaint-handler and dispute-resolver, and a person who helps an organization
work for change." Id. She refers to herself as an organizational ombudsperson. See id.
121 See Rowe, supra note 34, at 105.
122Id. at 103.
123 Rowe, supra note 115, at 395.
12 4 See id.; Rowe Interview, supra note 79.
125 Rowe, supra note 115, at 397.
126 CHANEY, supra note 106, at 5.
127 See John L. Madden & Joseph Krislov, A Universiy Experience with Academic
Ombudsmen, 55 EDuc. REc. 110, 111 (1974).
12 8 Donald C. Rowat & Geoffrey Wallace, The Campus Ombudsman in North America,
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EvOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCTION
151, 154 (Gerald E. Caiden ed., 1983).
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offices were most likely to be filled with faculty. 129 That the offices are
filled with faculty is not surprising, given that many ombuds offices on
university campuses were established to deal with student unrest.
At Boston College, many of the problems brought to the ombudsperson
in the 1970s involved the role of women on campus; at the University of
San Francisco, they dealt with a lack of communication or respect for the
rights of others, especially women and minorities. The primary role of the
ombudsperson was that of mediator. 130
Northeastern University in Boston created a dispute resolution process
for faculty grievances. One of the earliest steps involved investigation and
mediation by the ombudsperson, if the complainant so requested. If those
steps failed to resolve the dispute, the ombudsperson presented his findings
and recommendation to the provost, who could implement the
recommendation or take alternative action. The complainant could either
accept the provost action or continue with the grievance process. During a
seven-year period (1977-1984), one-third of all complainants sought
assistance from the ombudsperson 131
Although some have attempted to characterize the university
ombudspersons by noting, for example, that they "tend to be administrative
appointees found in the upper echelon of the organization" and that their
"constituents are primarily students," 132 a 1987 study of just thirteen
Canadian universities and one Canadian college showed that "differences
abound from office to office." 133
Generally, it can be said that today's American university or college
ombudspersons are appointed by and report to the institution's president,
"work mainly by conciliation" (although some "are trained mediators and
use formal mediation") and "rarely make formal investigations . . . [or]
formal recommendations because of [their] commitment to neutrality."134
One of this country's most well-known and published university
ombudspersons, Dr. Mary P. Rowe,135 notes that "there are two common
129 See id. at 155. At Sacramento State University, the ombuds office was created to
serve "all segments of the college community (students, administrators, and staff)." Keating &
Holden, supra note 106, at 42.
130 See Meymand, supra note 12, at 107, 137.
131 See Sebastian T. Persico, Dispute Resolution in Higher Education: The Use of
Ombudsmanship, Mediation and Arbitration in the Settlement of Faculty Grievances 82-83,
159 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
132 Meymand, supra note 12, at 1.
133 Christine McKee & Suzanne Belson, 7he Ombudsman in Canadian Universities: And
Justice forAU, 15 STUD. IN HIOHER EDUC. 197, 205 (1990).
134 E-mail from Richard Hebein, supra note 107.
135 Dr. Rowe has been a practicing ombudperson for twenty-three years and is co-
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kinds of ombudsperson today-the classical ombudsperson and the
organizational ombudsperson." 13 6  She focuses her research on the
organizational ombudsperson:
An organizational ombudsperson is a confidential and informal
information resource, communications channel, complaint-handler and
dispute-resolver, and a- person who helps an organization work for
change. Organizational ombudspeople are employed by public and private
institutions, agencies and corporations. Their purpose is to foster values
and decent behavior--fairness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity,
and respect. 137
Dr. Rowe has repeatedly surveyed organizational ombudspeople, noting that
"ombudsmanry is a profession in evolution." 1 38  She finds that
ombudspeople serve as "mediators, counselors, and third party
intervenors," in addition to most of the other functions "that any dispute
resolution practitioner can have. "139 "[Albout a third of the working time of
organizational ombudspeople is spent on systems change-that is, working
with line and staff managers to improve the supervision, human services,
and conflict management systems of the organization." 140 Dr. Rowe also
notes that the organizational ombudsperson "often will be especially
concerned with respect for those who are-or who see themselves as-less
powerful than others in a given situation." 141
founder of The Ombudsman Association. She has written extensively about the organizational
ombuds office. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 34; Mary P. Rowe, Options and Choice for
ConJlict Resolution in the Workplace, in NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MuTUAL GAIN 105
(Lavinia Hall ed., 1993); Mary P. Rowe, The Post-Tallhwok Navy Designs an Imegrated
Dispute Resoluion System, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 207 (1993); Mary P. Rowe, The Ombudsman's
Role In a Dispute Resolution System, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 353 (1991); Mary P. Rowe, Helping
People Help Themselves: An ADR Option for Interpersonal Conflict, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 239
(1990).
136 Rowe, supra note 34, at 103.
137 Id.
13 8 Id. at 106.
139 rd. at 105. "The exceptions are that organizational ombudspeople typically do not
investigate formally for management for the purpose of adjudication; do not keep case records
for the employer;, and do not make management decisions." Id.
140 Id. at 110.
141 Id. at 103.
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D. A Critical Examination" of Ombuds Offices
Much of the criticism of the ombuds office is directed not at the
classical model but at the transformation that has taken place as the office
has been adopted by various organizational entities. Some have proposed
that these transformed models no longer warrant the title of "ombudsmen,"
but instead should be termed "quasi-ombudsmen," because, although they
share "many of the classical ombudsman's characteristics," they are
"lacking at least one structural feature considered fundamental to the
institution. Most commonly, their independence is compromised in some
fashion." 142 For example, a number of scholars have noted the lack of
autonomy in university ombuds offices. 143 Obviously, if an ombudsperson
serves at the whim of administrators, with little job security, he or she may
be tempted to forego well-deserved criticism of administrative actions.
Another criticism of the ombuds office is that it is ineffective because
its powers are limited. The classical model provides for investigations,
recommendations and reports but not for direct enforcement. The office
relies for enforcement upon its persuasive power, which results from its
autonomy, expertise, neutrality and status. If any of these essential
characteristics are lacking, the office's effectiveness may be diminished as
well.
But criticism has also been leveled at the classical model. On the one
hand, the ombuds office is an "essential instrument in the modem
administrative state to reduce the.gap between the administrators and the
administered... to protect basic human rights against possible
infringements by the public bureaucracy .... "144 On the other hand, it
serves as a "public pacifier, a device to assuage public critics of government
operations at minimal cost without having to change anything
fundamental," 145 a "conservative and counter-revolutionary force, designed
to make the existing order more palatable.... -146 One scholar has
suggested that by 1980 the ombuds idea had been "oversold." He described
the ombuds model as
142 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 53, at 408.
143 See, e.g., Rowat, supra note 41, at 84 (arguing that because the ombudspersons are
usually appointed either by the administration or by students, they "often become advocates
for either the administration or the students"); STAMATAKOS & ISACHSEN, supra note 103, at
190, 193.
144 Caiden, supra note 24, at xvii.
145 Id.
146 See McKee & Belson, supra note 133, at 200.
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[tihe fine tuner on the television. It can do nothing to change the channel.
In fact, because the picture is made more bearable, we citizens may
continue to stare dumbly at "All-Star Championship Wrestling" rather
than make an effort to search for more meaningful fare. Ombudsmen may
serve as a means of habituating us to our usual perceptions of the world,
thus allowing free citizens to forget that grand responsibility of exploring
alternative realities. 147
He adds, "Universities now hope that the [ombuds] office will stop students
from occupying the dean's office."1 48 Such criticism has been leveled at
other informal dispute resolution processes as well. 149
Proponents of ombuds offices, and specifically the university ombuds
office, have more faith in the institution, calling it a "conscience on the
campus" which "helped to bind the wounds of a torn academic community"
and which is capable of solving "all of the problems which basically
confront a social system." 150 One study of Canadian university ombuds
offices revealed that many university ombudspersons "are 'agents for
change,' recommending modifications and improvements to rules,
regulations, policies and practices which are unclear, inequitable or
unfair." 151 They serve as "advisors, counselors and educators ...
informing people of their rights, explaining about existing channels for
grievance and appeals, and assisting people in the use of those
procedures." 152 They "provide a cost-effective, quick and informal route to
resolve problems and grievances" 15 3 and can "be used as a useful and
powerful tool for generating debate on institutional issues and as a catalyst
for institutional reform."'14
14 7 Robert Miewald, Ombudsman and Citizen: A Critique, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF THE OMBUDSMAN: EVOLUTION AND PRESENT FUNCrION 77, 80 (Gerald E.
Caiden ed., 1983).
148 Id. See also Keating & Holden, supra note 106, at 38, 44 ("[Rladical students" fear
it will "blunt the pressure for reform by acting as a safety valve .... "); A. Clare Buie
Chaney & James C. Hurst, The Applicability and Benefits of a Community Mental Health
Outreach Model for Campus Ombudsman Programs, J. C. STUDENT PERONNEL, May 1980,
at 215, 216 (arguing that the ombuds office may be harmful because it masks the problem and
prevents social change).
149 See infra text accompanying notes 167-171.
15 0 Meymand, supra note 12, at 20.
151 McKee & Belson, supra note 133, at 198.
152 rd.
153 Id. at 199.
154 Id. at 200.
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Much of the confusion about the ombuds office lies in the varied ways
in which it has been defined within various institutions. Clearly, the
structure and goals of the organizational ombuds office of McDonald's
differ from those of the legislatively .established ombuds office of the state
of Hawaii. The success or failure of any ombuds office depends, in part,
upon how closely it follows the classical model, in what ways it differs and
who holds the position of ombudsperson.
Given the differing perceptions of the effectiveness of this dispute
resolution mechanism, what role should it play in ADR's future? How
would it fit within a taxonomy of all dispute resolution mechanisms? Before
addressing these questions, it is important to examine a closely-related
dispute resolution mechanism which has currently come to occupy a
substantial role in the ombuds concept-mediation. For it is because of
mediation's deficiencies that the ombuds office presents itself as a viable,
effective and important component of the ADR revolution.
V. MEDIATION: PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE?
It is generally accepted that the growth of the movement within the
legal profession was sparked by both quantitative and qualitative concerns.
In the 1970s, a sense of urgency developed, but "[tihe decisive moment in
the legalization of informal alternatives came in 1976, at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice," sponsored by the American Bar Association and
others. 155 Judges and lawyers attending the conference (called the "Pound
Conference" in honor of Roscoe Pound's 1906 address to the ABA entitled
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice")
discussed the increasing costs and delays of litigation and formed a task
force which eventually recommended public funding of pilot programns
which would utilize mediation and arbitration to resolve disputes. 156 Others
joined the debate, urging innovative alternatives to traditional litigation. 157
Clearly, for clients who pay for unnecessary discovery and litigation arising
1 55 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUsTICE WITHOUT LAW? 123 (1983).
156 See generally THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
(A. Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979).
157 See, e.g., Derek Bok, Law and Its Discontents: A Critical Look at Our Legal
ystem, REC., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 12, reprinted in LEO KANOWiTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33-36 (1985); Derek Bok, A Flawed System, HARV.
MAO., May-June 1983, at 38, reprinted in Derek Bok, A Flawed System, 55 N.Y. ST. BJ. 8
(Oct. 1983); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1982, at 274;
Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83,
93-96 (1976).
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from intense combat, the costs of escalating hostilities can be measured both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
Quantitative concerns became even more apparent in the late 1970s and
early 1980s when courts and commentators began noting an increase in the
number of case filings, which overwhelmed many court dockets.15 1 This
perceived phenomenon was quickly labeled a "litigation explosion,"15 9
sparking a variety of proposals to alleviate the new problem. These included
accelerated discovery schedules, 160 an increased use of settlement
conferences 161 and novel devices such as the summary jury trial162 and
court-annexed arbitration. 163
Among the devices pressed into service to alleviate the "litigation
explosion" was one well-established dispute resolution mechanism-
mediation. Until the 1980s, mediation in the United States was practiced
almost exclusively in specific contexts, notably in community justice centers
and labor industry disputes. 164 But the 1980s saw the mediation field
expand into new areas and eventually into the court's repertoire. 165
In the past twenty years, the practice of mediation has proliferated in
ways many could not have imagined. In the United States, both lawyers and
158 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1982, at
275.
159 However, not everyone agreed that the litigation "explosion" was real. See, e.g.,
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV.
4, 63-65 (1983); Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current
Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87, 95-97 (1990).
160 See, e.g., FED R. Civ. P. 16(a), 16(b), 26(a) & 26(0.
161 See, e.g., FEDR. CIV. P. 16(a) & 16(c).
162 See Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV.
ST. L. Rnv. 43, 43 (1980). On March 5, 1980, Judge Thomas Lambros of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio became' the first federal judge to use this
method. During a summary jury trial, the parties' lawyers present an abbreviated version of
the evidence to a real jury, subsequently using the jury's "verdict" to assist in settlement
negotiations. See id.
163 Court-annexed arbitration was an integral part of the early pilot programs later
authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658. This dispute resolution process provides for the
mandatory referral of particular types of cases to nonbinding arbitration. See BARBARA J.
MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DIsTRIcT CouRTs 1, 15 (1990).
164 See KIMBERLEK. KOvACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRAcTICE 19 (1994).
16 5 Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his 1982 Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary, suggested "[d]ivorce, child custody, adoptions, personal injury, landlord and tenant
cases, and probate of estates" as "prime candidates" for mediation and arbitration. See
Burger, supra note 158, at 276.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
clients now often assume that a case will be referred to mediation; in some
instances, they suggest mediation without the court's prompting. Mediation
has become an integral part of some forms of litigation: family,
neighborhood and landlord-tenant disputes; small business disputes; some
misdemeanor cases and a host of other conflicts. The number of mediators
in this country alone is now estimated in the tens of thousands, 166 and those
numbers continue to grow.
But this growth has not gone unchallenged. Numerous commentators
have questioned the use of alternative dispute resolution in general. In 1983,
Jerold S. Auerbach published a powerful critique of alternative dispute
resolution, 167 in which he called ADR a "framework of backlash against the
assertion of legal rights" by those disempowered citizens "who only
recently had begun to litigate successfully to protect and extend their
rights." 168 Auerbach clearly recognized that disparities in wealth and power
led to disparities of result in the formal judicial system, but he noted that
"diversion from the legal system is likely to accentuate that inequality. "169
Professor Owen Fiss was another of the early ADR critics. In 1984, he
noted, "I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to
judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate
basis." 170 He raised concerns about coerced party consent, about agreements
between agents without proper authority and about adequate judicial
enforcement of agreements. He concluded that "although dockets are
trimmed, justice may not be done."171
This section focuses primarily on Professor Fiss' concern with coerced
party consent. Coerced party consent is a special, and perhaps the most
serious, concern because parties have little recourse once they have entered,
seemingly with consent, into a court-approved agreement. That concern is
most frequently shared by other critics of alternative dispute resolution,
critics of mediation in particular. 172
166 See Richard C. Reuben, Model Ethics Rules Limit Mediator Role, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1996, at 25.
167 See AUERBACH, supra note 155.
168 Id. at 124-126.
169 Id. at 144-145.
170 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
171 Id.
172 Professor Fiss' concern about settlement without authority focuses primarily on the
authority (or lack thereo) of agents who purport to act on behalf of groups of people, such as
racial minorities or consumer groups, resulting in a settlement by a few on behalf of the
many. His concern about enforcement of court-approved settlement agreements focuses
primarily on the difficulties of continuing court supervision and enforcement of structural
reform consent decrees. Clearly, Professor Fiss is most mindful of the dangers of settlement
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For example, Richard Delgado believes that mediation and other
informal dispute resolution processes carry the potential to injure members
of racial or ethnic minorities by denying them the formal safeguards which
the judicial system offers. 173 These safeguards include the Code of Judicial
Conduct, voir dire, peremptory challenges and procedural and evidentiary
rules. 174 They also include the formality of the court system itself. "In some
settings people feel free to vent hostile or denigrating attitudes toward
members of minority groups; in others they do not."1 75
The formalities of a court trial-the flag, the black robes, the ritual-
remind those present that the occasion calls for the higher, "public"
values, rather than the lesser values embraced during moments of
informality and intimacy. In a courtroom trial the American Creed, with
its emphasis on fairness, equality, and respect for personhood,
governs. 176
Separating a dispute from both the physical confines of a formal courthouse
and the formal procedural rules which govern ordinary disputes may result
in an environment which encourages the expression and exercise of racist
beliefs.
Others have voiced concerns about the impact alternative dispute
resolution has upon the poor and disempowered. For example, Professor
Richard Abel, a well-known voice of the critical legal studies movement,
argues that informal dispute resolution mechanisms "neutralize conflict by
responding to grievances in ways that inhibit their transformation into
serious challenges to the domination of state and capital." 177 By erecting an
informal system of dispute resolution, the state exercises its influence to
assist in the resolution of some conflicts which might not have previously
been subject to its reach. This has a tendency to release societal pressure
in complex cases involving large groups of persons represented by a few, although he argues
that "the number of cases I am referring to is [not] trivial," nor would he tolerate dividing all
cases into either "those [complex] lawsuits" which should not be settled, or others, which
should be. Id. at 1087.
173 See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Fomaity: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1360-1361, 1375-1391.
See also AUERBACH, supra note 155, at 67-68 (arguing that informal dispute resolution might
allow the middle class to dominate and control minorities).
174 See Delgado et al., supra note 173, at 1367-1375.
175 ld. at 1387.
17 6 1d. at 1388.
177 Richard Abel, The Contradiction of Infonnal Justice, in 1 THE POLrTICS OF
INFoRMAL JusTtic 267, 280 (Richard Abel ed., 1982).
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which might otherwise have led to political upheaval, creating societal
dependence upon the informal mechanisms and thereby strengthening the
state's hand. 178
Other scholars question how well women fare in mediation,
specifically in divorce or family mediation. Trina Grillo, while asserting
that "[t]he family court system... can be relied on neither to produce just
results nor to treat those subject to it respectfully and humanely," concludes
that mediation does no better, and in" fact can be "destructive to many
women and some men." 179 Professor Grillo believes that family mediation
"requires [the parties] to speak in a setting they have not chosen and often
imposes a rigid orthodoxy as to how they should speak, make decisions, and
be," thereby excluding their "authentic voices." 180
But Carrie Menkel-Meadow believes that "mediation as a process is not
necessarily good or bad for women's interests; it depends on who the
mediator is and what model of mediation is being used."18 1 Currently,
although many courts direct litigants to mediation, the field is open to both
qualified and unqualified mediators. 182 A variety of ethical standards or
178 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing Nature of
State Power in Late Capitalism, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUsTICE 249, 260 (Richard
Abel ed., 1982). See also AUERBACH, supra note 155, at 144; Richard Hofrichter,
Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American Capitalism: A
Perspective, in THE PoLITcs OF INFoRMALtJUsTIcE 207, 237-240 (Richard Abel ed., 1982).
17 9 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
LJ. 1545, 1549 (1991). See also Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 207-218 (1994) (arguing that certain
"high risk" divorce clients should avoid mediation).
180 Grillo, supra note 179, at 1549-1550.
181 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 53 n.78 (1985). See also Carol Bohmer
& Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on Women and Children
4fter Divorce, 28 FAM. L.Q. 223 (1994) (asserting, inter alia, that when mediators are
lawyers, results of divorce mediation closely reflect litigation outcomes, making women and
children no worse off by using mediation rather than negotiation or litigation).
182 A long-awaited study of qualifications by the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (SPIDR) issued in 1989 concluded that no single entity, but rather a variety
of professional organizations, should establish qualifications; that the greater the degree
of choice the parties have over the ADR process, the less mandatory should be the
qualification requirements; and that the qualification criteria should be based on
performance, rather than on paper credentials.
John Feerick et al., Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1995 3. Disp. RESOL. 95, 96.
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codes of conduct have been adopted by a variety of organizations, but
uniform standards have yet to become widely accepted. 18 3 Currently, "[tlhe
standards of conduct of individual professional groups are still the primary
source of regulation in most states . . . Such groups, however, lack
enforcement power and have to rely upon the individual professions to
undertake enforcement sanctions against one of their members." 184
Like Professor Menkel-Meadow, Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush
believes that mediation is only as good as the mediator. While believing that
mediation presents an opportunity to transform people and teach them to
interact differently and positively in conflict,185 Professor Bush at the same
time acknowledges "the absence of any clear and demanding standards of
practice for mediators, both in the context of initial training and as an
ongoing guide to practitioner conduct." 18 6 He recognizes that the profession
is "insufficiently professionalized and disciplined."
18 7
In attempting to devise a set of ethical standards, Professor Bush
conducted interviews with approximately eighty mediators, focusing on
"interpersonal neighborhood or community disputes, divorce and custody
183 It has been argued that no one set of standards should be applied to mediation. For
example, labor mediators generally deal with mediation challenges very different from those
faced by divorce mediators. A variety of governmental entities and private organizations have
drafted standards for mediators. These include the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Bar
Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules of Discipline for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators; the Hawaii Judiciary, Standards for Private and Public Mediators in the State of
Hawaii; Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation; Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR),
Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility and the Center for Dispute Resolution of
Denver, Colorado, Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators. See Robert B. Moberly,
Eddcal Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation
Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 702, 704"n.15 (1994); Feerick et al., supra note 182, at
96 nn.4, 8. Recently, three prominent dispute resolution organizations-the American
Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association and SPIDR-drafled proposed
standards of conduct for mediators. See Feerick et al., supra note 182, at 96. And in late
1995, the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution completed its draft of the
first model ethical standards for mediators. They have so far been endorsed by the ABA
Litigation Section, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution. See Reuben, supra note 166, at 25.
18 4 Feerick et al., supra note 182, at 96.
18 5 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLOER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CoNFucr THROUGH EMPOEMENT AND RECOONmON 81 (1994).
186 Robert A. Baruch Bush, 7he Dilemmas of Mediption Practice: A Study of Etcal
Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J.-DIsP. REsOL. 1, 1.
18 7 Id.
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conflicts, and disputed legal claims for civil damages." 188 He found that the
mediators faced a number of difficult situations with little guidance for
resolving them. For example, they were unsure of the appropriate action
when one party attempted to coerce another, when a lawyer coerced a client
or even when a mediator attempted to coerce one of the parties.18 9 "IT]he
question is whether the mediator should push any party by any means in any
situation, or whether there are limits on persuasive tactics, and if so what
are those limits?" 19° Another area of concern had to do with party
incapacity or ignorance of either the facts or the law. 19 1
But the most disturbing question which these mediators raised echoes
the concerns of others: What if the parties agree to a "bad" solution which
the "mediator believes .. .is a 'poor quality' solution to the dispute" or
that it is unfair because of "gross imbalance of power between the parties
that leads the weaker party to accept an unfair solution?" 192 Should the
mediator interfere and thereby jeopardize neutrality? Should he withdraw as
mediator? In other words, is a mediator's primary concern with finality,
with resolution, with "ending it" 193 or should he include in his concerns the
achievement ofjustice or a fair result?
The American Bar Association's recently drafted model ethical
standards for mediators reflect a policy choice in favor of mediator
neutrality over mediator involvement. According to the model standards,
the mediator's role is to "[r]ecognize that mediation is based on principles
of self-determination by the parties," rather than to offer an opinion of the
likely result if the case were litigated. 194
Mediation can be empowering and justice-achieving if the parties are
taught how to resolve other disputes and if it focuses on empowering a party
so that he is able to use these skills in a greater community. 195 But,
unfortunately, some mediators are evaluated (and evaluate their own skills)
based upon the percentage of cases mediated to a final agreement. 196
188 Id. at 2.
189 See id. at 17-18.
190 Id. at 20.
191 See id. at 20-21.
192 Id. at 24-25.
193 In fact, a recent book about ADR seems to acknowledge this focus in its title. See
SUSAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA
(1988).
194 See Reuben, supra note 166, at 25.
195 In fact, Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush's approach to mediation is not centered
around reaching agreement as an end in itself; rather, he hopes to transform the way in which
people interact in all conflicts. See BUSH & FOLOER, supra note 185, at 81.
196 1 reach this conclusion after numerous conversations with mediation practitioners and
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Some would argue that justice is too ambiguous to define and that a
"just" result is one which only the parties can define by the terms of their
agreement. Thus, an agreement, because it is an agreement, is just. And that
may be so in an ideal world: a world without power imbalance; without
disparity in wealth and other resources; without racism, sexism,
homophobia or age discrimination. But that is not our world.
Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, people have attempted to define
justice. They speak of fairness, equity, impartiality and rightness. "Justice
is still commonly used in the two primary senses, of giving every man his
due, and of the setting right of wrong." 197 A just result must be one that
would have been reached if both (or all) parties had equal bargaining power
and operated in a world which does not disadvantage one of the parties on
the basis of race, gender, religion, etc. The result must reflect an
evenhanded, fair process as well as a fair result. The parties should all feel
that they were heard and respected, and that the result was fair. A just result
should benefit society generally, in addition to benefiting the parties
themselves. A result which benefits only the parties may damage others,
which is not just. For example, in a workplace, two parties may be involved
in a dispute over pay or other benefits. Providing only one employee with a
disputed benefit may damage those who also deserve it, but have not
complained.
Mediation may resolve a specific dispute between two persons without
repairing the underlying problem. It may involve purchasing the
complainant's silence or satisfaction on a one-time basis, but it may also
leave behind a festering wound which will infect others.
Particularly in a large organization governed by one body of rules,
policies or regulations and administered by one managing body-federal,
state or local government agency or department; private workplace; public
or private school or university-it is inevitable that problems will recur.
Any defect in the organizational structure or its employees will affect
multiple personnel. One bad manager can create problems for all those over
whom he has authority. One harassing employee may create a hostile
environment for many of those with whom he works.
A formal complaint process may resolve some of the problems. Like
litigation, it draws attention to the problem, ordinarily invoking formal,
written procedures created to resolve organizational disputes. It pits the
complainant against the wrongdoer in a formal battle, sometimes forcing
after attendance at numerous speeches given by mediators.
197 j.p. Plamenatz, Jusdce, in A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 364 (Julius
Gould & W'lliam L. Kolb eds., 1964). For a thorough discussion of the definition of justice,
see LARRY B. HILL, REFORM, JUSTICE, AND THE OMBUDSMAN (International Ombudsman
Institute Occasional Paper 17, 1982).
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others in the organization to take sides and in some instances to testify for
either the complainant or the responding party. The process is often lengthy
and may be expensive. During the time committed to the process of
resolution, hostilities and dissension increase. By the time the problem is
resolved, one of the parties may have left the organization or transferred to
another position within the organization. In any event, the organization as a
whole has suffered irreparably.
Because such formal mechanisms often lead to significant disruption
and animosity, aggrieved persons may choose not to complain at all. Like
those who suffer an injury in the greater society and choose to forego
litigation, workers may forego a formal workplace complaint process which
carries with it too high a price. As a result, the organization may find that
some of its more productive members leave, or suffer, or work less
productively or become disgruntled, while the underlying problem goes
unresolved.
In an effort to resolve problems which fail to find their way into formal
dispute resolution mechanisms, many organizations have instituted
mediation or conciliation procedures. These are designed to minimize
confrontation, hostility, disruption and delay. They often keep disputes
private and confidential. In fact, most mediators have an obligation to
maintain the confidences of all parties involved in mediation unless the
parties consent to disclosure. When a dispute is resolved, it is resolved
privately.
The advantages of such a process are clear. Those parties who shunned
the pandemonium of the formal grievance process may welcome the quiet
whisper of mediation. Mediation provides them with an opportunity to be
heard and with assistance in reaching an agreement for resolution of the
conflict. When the parties have finished mediation, the conflict has been
resolved.
The price paid for this method of resolution may not include disruption
to the workplace, increased hostilities or loss of a good employee. Rather,
the price may be measured in diminished justice. One party may never
realize that he received less than a formal grievance might have provided, or
that sexist or racist attitudes biased the result or that the other party was
much more experienced in mediation techniques and thereby manipulated a
more favorable result.
More importantly, even if this particular result was just, it may not
have achieved an organizational benefit. In fact, the result reached may have
satisfied both of the mediating parties at the expense of others in the
organization. For example, a supervisor may agree that a female should
have received a promotion or benefit and that denial of the promotion or
benefit was unfair. Together they agree that she will receive favorable
treatment at the next opportunity. Because the agreement is confidential,
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other employees will never know that they are disadvantaged when
competing for the promotion or benefit.
The organization suffers yet another disadvantage when mediation is the
process of choice. Because of the secrecy surrounding the dispute itself,
mediation addresses a particular dispute between two specific persons, but
does little to attack an underlying problem which may be widespread. If the
problem is a particular rule, policy or employee, others in the organization
will eventually be affected and require intervention, either through
mediation or through the formal grievance process.
In those situations when the formal grievance process offers too much
and mediation too little, when the formal grievance process represents an
overreaction and mediation an underreaction, the ombuds office may offer
the optimal solution.
VI. THE OMBUDS OFFICE
An ombuds office which emulates as much as practicable the function
and procedure of the classical ombudsman may minimize hostility and
disruption while at the same time result in structural change which will
alleviate similar problems in the future. The organizational ombuds office,
as it has evolved, has focused primarily on its mediation role and, as a
result, has shed some of the characteristics of the classical ombuds office
model which has made the model so successful throughout the world.
Closer reliance upon the key characteristics of the classical model offers an
alternative clearly preferable to mediation alone.
In his 1983 publication, Justice Without Law,198 Jerold S. Auerbach
describes early uses of alternative dispute resolution:
The success of non-legal dispute settlement has always depended upon a
coherent community vision. How to resolve conflict ... is how (or
whether) to preserve community. Historically, arbitration and mediation
were the preferred alternatives. They expressed an ideology of
communitarian justice without formal law, an equitable process based on
reciprocal access and trust among community members. They flourished
as indigenous forms of community self-government. 199
Auerbach refers to Utopian Christians and mercenary merchants as
examples of such communities. They each "shared the understanding that
law begins where community ends. So they developed patterns and
institutions of dispute settlement that contained conflict within their own
198 See AUERBACH, supra note 155.
199Id. at 4.
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community boundaries-with courts and lawyers as remote as possible."200
As long as disputes remained confined to homogeneous communities,
nonlegal dispute resolution was successful. But when expanded to
heterogeneous groups of people with divergent visions and values, "[t]he
concept of justice loses the clarity it possessed in a communal context.
Justice becomes a compromise that gives least offense to the most
people." 201
If one accepts the notion that "[o]nly when there is congruence between
individuals and their community, with shared commitment to common
values, is there a possibility for justice without law"2°2- or at least the
notion that nonlegal dispute resolution has a greater likelihood of achieving
justice in a homogeneous community-then ADR stands a greater chance of
success in an organizational context. For example, those who work in a
federal or state agency, or for a private employer, share certain work-related
goals and values which might contribute to successful, justice-achieving
ADR. In this sense, mediation should lead to just results. On the other
hand, such workforces no longer consist primarily of white males with
similar backgrounds and are in that respect more heterogeneous than in the
past. In this context, mediation may not lead to just results. The ombuds
model offers a greater possibility of achieving not only a final resolution of
disputes but also a fairer result.
Assume, for example, that in a university history department one male
faculty member engages in abusive behavior against a female faculty
member or female teaching assistants. The behavior may or may not rise to
the level of sexual harassment. If one of his victims initiates a formal
grievance, she may ultimately win. If she does, she will no doubt have
divided the history department between those who support the accused and
those who support the accuser; over a period of many months, she will have
focused much of her time and attention on the process, sacrificing her
teaching and research projects; and she will most likely be treated as a
pariah by many in the department. For some, the reward is worth the price.
But for the woman who is unwilling to pay the price, the only options
may be to do nothing or to mediate. If she chooses mediation, the most
likely outcome for this complainant is that the male faculty member will
cease his objectionable behavior toward her. But mediation may not stop the
behavior altogether. The accused may simply find other victims or exercise
more discretion. His supervisors (in this case, the department chair or the
university provost and president) may never learn of the problem, since
mediation participants are bound to secrecy.
200 Id. at 5.
201 Id. at 16.
202 Id. at 16.
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How would an ombuds office in the classical model handle the dispute
differently? Disregarding the myriad of ways in which ombuds offices have
been transfigured in this country, classically-modeled university
ombudspersons would possess the following characteristics: They would
have legal knowledge and experience and would possess a high degree of
integrity. 203 Training and experience in both the law and mediation would
be helpful, but "multi-cultural experience" is just as important. 204 They
would be responsible for monitoring the organization's integrity and
effectiveness, mindful not only of unlawful conduct, but also of arbitrary
and unreasonable actions. They would serve as watchdogs over
organizational members, including its administration, and would rely for
their credibility on their independence, expertise, impartiality, accessibility
and powers of persuasion rather than control. 20 5
Ombudspersons would be given protection from summary dismissal in
a way appropriate to the specific organization. For example, in a university
setting, a panel of faculty, staff and administration officials might select the
ombudsperson from an applicant pool. For those ombuds offices serving
students as well, the selection panel would also include student
representation. Or a panel of organizational members might select two or
three candidates from a pool with the organization's top administrator
selecting one from among these. The ombudsperson might be given a five-
year appointment with reappointment upon a majority vote of the entire
panel. Or the ombudsperson might be appointed by and report to the board
of directors with the CEO having veto power over the chosen nominee.20 6
If the ombudsperson instead is appointed by the organization's
president or chief executive officer and serves at her will, it might be
difficult to overcome the appearance of pro-management bias. It will also be
difficult for the ombudsperson to disregard her tenuous job security when
making recommendations or deciding how thoroughly to investigate a
particular complaint. Many organizational ombudspersons argue that the
perception of bias is exaggerated. Pressures exist from all sides which tend
to keep the ombudsperson relatively neutral; if the perception of such bias
203 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
204 See Rowe, supra note 115, at 400. Dr. Rowe states: "Multi-cultural experience is of
such extraordinary importance as to commend more than one person at the end of the line,
even if several people must serve part-time." Id. An example of this emphasis can be seen on
the international level. Three Bosnians-a Muslim, a Croat and a Serb-currently serve as
ombudspersons of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina "to sift through and deal with
the... claims of human rights violations within the federation." A Voice for the People,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 64.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
206 See Futter, supra note 80, at 35.
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exists, ombudspersons would soon be out of a job for lack of clients.
Besides, many disputes within an organization do not involve management-
employee disputes, but rather employee-employee disputes. 20 7 Nevertheless,
insulating the ombudsperson from unnecessary suspicion of bias offers the
best chance of maintaining the office's credibility.
An ombuds office in the classical style would permit all members of the
organization to have access to the ombuds office to file complaints. The
ombudsperson would have power to investigate complaints, to issue reports
about the complaints and to make recommendations for resolving the
problem. In most cases, the report would protect the identity of those who
are its focus. In other cases, the ombudsperson might believe it important to
disclose that information. In some countries, ombudspersons furnish the
public with case reports,20s providing a measure of trust in and credibility
of the organization as a whole.
Issues of ombuds confidentiality have received attention recently in the
United States. In contrast to the classical ombuds model, organizational
ombudspersons generally do not issue reports or disclose any information
about the persons involved. They maintain strict confidentiality in their
dealings with their clients. 20 9 Confidence is maintained most likely because
organizational ombudspersons currently focus primarily on their role as
informal dispute resolvers, and mediators and have adopted many of
mediation's characteristics.
As with mediation, confidentiality at the initial stages is protected.
Most organizational ombudspersons
do not keep case records for the employer and they resist appearing as
witnesses in judicial proceedings. Ombudspeople maintain that there is (or
should be) a privilege which belongs to the office .... Many
ombudspeople have an agreement with their employers that the employer
will not call the ombudsperson in its own defense. 210
Attempts to breach ombuds confidentiality have been rebuffed in a
variety of ways. In Shabazz v. Scurr,2 11 a federal court recognized a limited
state law privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential information held by
207 See Rowe Interview, supra note 79.
208 See supra text accompanying note 20.
209 See Rowe Interview, supra note 79.
210 Rowe, supra note 34, at 104. See also STANDARDS OF PRAcTICE, Standards 1, 3 and
3.3 (The Ombudsman Association) ("We base our practice on confidentiality .... We assert
that there is a privilege with respect to communications with the ombudsman .... An
ombudsman keeps no case records .... ").
211 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
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a prison ombudsman. 2 12 Likewise, in Kientzy v. McDonnellDouglas
Corp.,213 the court protected the confidential communications made to a
McDonnellDouglas Corporation ombudsperson. 214 In both Shabazz and
Kientzy, the courts based their decisions upon Federal Rule of Evidence 501
("privilege... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts . . .,).215 The Kientzy court
articulated the balancing of the common law principles regarding privilege
utilized by both courts:
(1) the communication must be one made in the belief that it will not be
disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance of the
relationship between the parties; (3) the relationship should be one that
society considers worthy of being fostered; and (4) the injury to the
relationship incurred by disclosure must be greater than the benefit gained
in the correct disposal of litigation.2 16
The Kientzy court found all four principles satisfied.2 17
Although such judicial creation of privileges is permitted in federal
courts, state courts may lack that discretion. In those cases, courts may
instead find that the ombudsperson's mediation function brings it within a
statutory mediation privilege, if such exists. In Garstang v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County,218 the plaintiff attempted to compel discovery of
communications disclosed to a California Institute of Technology
ombudsperson.2 19 The court found that the statutory mediation privilege did
not apply because it required that all parties execute an agreement in writing
prior to mediation; no such writing had been executed. 220 The court,
however, proceeded to find the communications protected under a qualified
212 See id. at 94.
213 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991). An unreported case, Roy v. United Technologies
Corp., Civil No. H-89-680 (JAC) (D. Conn. May 29, 1990), is considered the "seminal case
recognizing both the federal common law privilege and the implied contract basis for barring
the disclosure of ombuds' communications." Charles L. Howard & Maria A. Gulluni, The
Ombuds Confidentiality Phivilege: Theory and Mechanics, THE OMBUDSMAN Assoc. 3 (1996).
214 See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 611.
215 See Shabazz, 662 F. Supp. at 91;,Kentzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571.
216 See Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571. See also In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir.
1983). See generally Shabazz, 662 F. Supp. at 90.
217 133 F.R.D. 570, 571 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
218 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 84 (1995).
219 See id. at 86.
220 See id. at 87.
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privilege based on the state constitutional right of privacy. 22 1
Still other courts have based ombuds communication protection on an
implied contract theory, because those who visit the ombuds office do so
upon the promise of confidentiality. 222
Obviously, those ombuds offices created by statute may find the
necessary protection from state court disclosure within the statute which
created them.2M
It is clear that confidentiality is of utmost importance to present day
American organizational ombudspersons, even though such emphasis is
lacking in the classical ombuds model. As discussed below, strict adherence
to total confidentiality may not offer the greatest chance for justice-
achieving dispute resolution.
Regardless of how confidentiality issues are resolved, adherence to the
classical model would require the ombudsperson to investigate the
complaint. In some instances, she may decide that no further action is
warranted. In other cases, further investigation might lead to exercise of
some form of "organizational subpoena" power.
As with the classical model, ombudspersons would have no power to
make decisions or to order organizational members to do something or to
reverse official action; that power would be reserved for the formal
complaint process. Ombudspersons would seek solutions through the
process of investigation, conciliation and persuasion.
They would explore options and assist the complainant in exercising her
options. When problems recur, they would recommend changes in policies,
rules or practices. Their authority and influence would derive from the fact
that they are appointed by a cross-section of organizational members and
report ultimately to the organization's top administrator. 224 Their reporting
ordinarily would include only that information required for administrative
and budgetary purposes.
Ombuds offices would have not merely as their goal the resolution of
individual disputes. Rather, they would seek to solve individual complaints
while at the same time improving organizational effectiveness. As
envisioned in the original classical model, they might also promote group
221 See id. at 90.
222 See generally Roy v. United Technologies Corp., Civil No. H-89-680 (JAC) (D.
Conn. May 29, 1990) (recognizing both a federal common law privilege and implied
contract); Criado v. rT Corp., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Both cases are discussed in detail in Howard & Gulluni, supra note 213, at 3-7.
223 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.55.260 (1993) (regarding Ombudsman's privilege not
to testify).
224 See, e.g., Caiden et al., supra note 3, at 13.
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identity and group solidarity;225 save the time and expense of formal
grievance procedures; protect and give "psychological security" to the
group members;22 6 provide "new protections against bureaucratic bungling
and abuses of power"; serve "as a unique mechanism of democratic control
over bureaucracy";227 serve as an "essential instrument in the modem
administrative state to reduce the gap between the administrators and the
administered" and "protect basic human rights against possible
infringements by the public bureaucracy. " 22
In fact, The Ombudsman Association, formed in 1982 as the Corporate
Ombudsman Association, has Standards of Practice that provide
ombudspersons "advocate for fair processes and their fair administration,"
"identify new problems" and "provide support for responsible systems
change." 2 9  The Ethical Principles for University and College
Ombudspersons provide: "An ombudsperson is guided by the following
principles: objectivity, independence, accessibility, confidentiality and
justice; justice is pre-eminent. "23
The ombudsman historically has not been seen as a muted, facilitating
neutral sitting silently by until called into service by the parties' hostile
silence, then coaxing the parties into continued communication until they
reach an agreement. The office includes not only these characteristics, but
also much more. Initially, classical ombudspersons listen to the
complainant. Then they investigate. Then, if they find the complaint
legitimate, they engage others in resolution of the dispute. They may
require the production of records and witnesses from anyone in the
organization, including the top administrators. Once they find the complaint
legitimate, they assume their role as "citizen defenders."
In some respects the office resembles a grand jury or inspector general,
intent on protecting positions of public trust from corruption, misconduct
and mismanagement. 23 1 The ombudsperson's concern is not to protect the
organization's reputation; rather it is to help ensure that all of the
organization's members conduct themselves in a manner neither arbitrary,
dishonest, illegal, disruptive nor unethical. Unlike litigation, the role of an
ombuds office is not viewed as a battle of adversaries. And unlike a
mediator, ombudspersons can take sides, not in favor of the complainant
225 See Meymand, supra note 12, at 19.
226 See Gwyn, supra note 22, at 42.
227 See ROWAT, supra note 23, at vii-viii.
228 See Caiden, supra note 24, at xvii.
2 2 9 STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, Standards 5.3 & 8 (The Ombudsman Association).
2 3 0 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE OMBUDSPERSONS 1. Ideally,
"justice" includes substantive justice, as well as procedural justice.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
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and against the respondent, but in favor of honesty, integrity, legality and
principle. Their client is integrity. Therefore, when the university female
faculty member or teaching assistant mentioned above complains to the
ombudsperson, his role will not end if he finds that the conduct does not
rise to the level of a federal Title VII sexual harassment violation. If the
ombudsperson finds instead that the conduct demonstrates merely poor
judgment but that it nevertheless disrupts the workplace or interferes with
the optimal productivity of coworkers, he can take action.
His actions may involve mediation between the two parties. They may
involve individual counseling only with the respondent. They may involve
conducting interviews with others or gaining access to university records.
The ombudsperson may discover that the female complainant has a history
of asserting unfounded allegations or that the male has had several other
accusations leveled against him. The ombudsperson's role ideally is to
determine whether a problem exists and to remedy it. He may end the
investigation shortly after it begins, or he may launch a full-scale
investigation and issue a report at its conclusion.
Empowering the ombuds office to its fullest extent inevitably involves
the controversial confidentiality issue. It is clear that present day
organizational ombudspersons have opted for mediation's model of
privileged communications. But for the ombuds office to achieve its full
potential for justice-achieving dispute resolution, it also seems clear that the
office should not be absolutely and completely cloaked in secrecy. A return
to the classical model would provide for confidentiality as far as possible
and for limited disclosure when essential. For example, the ombuds statute
at issue in Shabazz v. Scurf 32 provided that the ombudsperson "maintain
secrecy in respect to all matters including the identities of the complainants
or witnesses ... except that the General Assembly, any standing committee
of the General Assembly or the Governor may require disclosure of any
matter and shall have complete access to the records and files of the
[ombudsperson]." 233
Although such unbridled disclosures should not be countenanced,
providing the ombudsperson with limited discretion to disclose confidential
information to specific high-ranking officers or directors when absolutely
necessary, while protecting as much as possible the identity of the
individuals involved, may provide the ombudsperson with the ability to
produce a just result and effect structural or systems change. Obviously,
permission to disclose confidential information is preferable, and a trusted,
skilled ombudsperson is well-positioned to obtain such permission. But in
232 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987). The statute at issue was Iowa Code §§ 601G.8,
601G.20 (1985). See id.
233 Shabazz, 662 F. Supp. at 91 (citing IOWA CODE § 601G.8 (1985)).
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rare instances, the ombudsperson should be authorized to make limited
disclosure even without permission taking care to withhold information
which would reveal party identities.
In addition to limited disclosure, the classical ombudsperson also
possesses the power to publicize governmental wrongdoing, a power
unlikely to find acceptance within private or even public organizations in
the United States today. But the possibility of organization-wide publicity
could empower the ombuds office. In some cases, the ombudsperson may
find the conduct so egregious that such publicity is warranted, although she
would protect the identity of the parties. Publicity is most appropriate when
the ombudsperson has discovered a problem which does not involve an
individual in the organization but rather a general policy or practice which
should be changed. For example, had a British ombuds office been in place
to remedy the Crichel Down affair, 23 4 the ombudsman could have issued a
public report which recommended new guidelines, policies or even
legislation to guide the government in its dealings with private landowners.
It has also been suggested that the ombudsperson have the right to
appeal to the organization's governing board or agency if her
recommendations are not satisfactorily followed and that the ombudsperson
"have the theoretical right to comment in the proxy statement or the annual
report." 23 5 "Further, where a serious violation of law was involved and was
being allowed to continue without correction, he would have the right [but
not the duty]- after exhausting all his internal remedies-to take the matter
up with the appropriate public agency." 23 6
Another significant function of the ombuds office includes assistance
with process informing the complainant of other methods of resolution and
the action required to initiate and employ some other method. Indeed, a
complaint heard frequently during this author's university service was an
inability to understand and negotiate the formal grievance procedure. The
ombuds office might well determine that the complainant prefers to file a
formal complaint and might therefore assist her in initiating that procedure.
In the alternative, the ombuds office could assist the complainant in
developing additional options. 23 7
The organizational ombuds office by necessity differs in some respects
from the classical model, but the most effective office would involve the
234 See supra text accompanying note 31.
235 Futter, supra note 80, at 38.
2 36 Id
.
237 Developing options is a key focus of the ombuds office at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and of the Standards of Practice for organizational ombudspersons. See Rowe,
supra note 34; Rowe, Options and Choice for Conflict Resolution in the Workplace, supra
note 135, at 108.
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most minimal of differences. Rather than involving the affairs of a national
or state government, the organizational ombudsperson has jurisdiction over
a "micro universe"-the organization. Thus, "subpoena" power stems not
from the national or state government, but from the organizational
governing body.
When the organization is public rather than private, its powers may
well be statutory, set forth in the legislation which governs the
organization. "The office will thereby be completely independent of
the... administration and have its own source of law." 23 8 Establishment of
the office by statute provides it with autonomy and protects it from the
budget ax or the whim of dissatisfied administrators. Separate funding from
the governing body, rather than from the funds available to one or two
administrators for distribution to various units, also contributes to the
office's independence.
A private organization is unlikely to have at its disposal statutory
restraints. It is incumbent upon such an organization to mimic as much as
possible the self-restraints of a public organization meaning that attempts
should be made to build ombuds autonomy and independence into the
organization's governing documents and structure.
For all ombuds offices, physical as well as fiscal independence from
any one constituency serves the laudable goal of minimizing the appearance
of bias. For example, at a university, the ombuds office might be placed in
the library building or some other neutral spot rather than located down the
hall from the administrative offices or in a faculty building. It should also
be separately staffed at every opportunity emphasizing the independence this
office has from any one constituency.
The ombuds office offers several advantages over the use of a narrow
mediation focus. The ombudsperson will in many cases serve as a mediator.
But if mediation fails or if the problem is likely to recur and involves a
faulty policy or employee, the role of the ombudsperson differs from the
role of mediator. Rather than serving as a communications facilitator,
assisting the parties in reaching an agreement, the ombudsperson serves as
an organizational watchdog, assisting not only these parties but also the
efficient, effective functioning of the organization and all its parts,
including these individuals. The ombudsperson is neither a silent neutral nor
an advocate for the complainant.
Wherever the [classical] ombudsman has functioned, he has been purely
and plainly an advocate of sound administration, not an advocate of the
position of the complainant .... The ombudsman... is simply stationed
at the margin, as it were, between the citizen and the official, and he must
238 Rowat & Wallace, supra note 128, at 152.
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be concerned with seeing that justice is done to public servants as well as
to the public whom they serve. 239
The ombudsperson can seek out problems before they are presented to
him, at all levels of the organization, including the administrative level. The
ombudsperson seeks to assure all organizational constituents that their
psychological security and basic human rights have a defender. The
ombudsperson focuses not so much upon past actions but upon the future of
the organization and its constituents. "Since... the primary purpose of the
external critic [ombudsman] is to build for the future rather than to exhume
the past, constructive suggestions about the avoidance of similar
controversies may not be precluded by inability to reach a firm conclusion
about guilt in the present instance." 240 The ombudsperson is accountable for
his response to problems within the organization and must provide a
rationale for any recommendations or actions taken. Unlike the silent,
invisible mediator, the ombudsperson who follows the classical model may
be proactive and public. 24 1
The power of the ombuds office also differs from that of a mediator.
Typically, mediation proponents
deploy the discourse of interests and needs. They reconceptualize the
person from a carrier of rights to a subject with needs and problems, and
in the process hope to move the legal field from a terrain of authoritative
decision making where force is deployed to an arena of distributive
bargaining and therapeutic negotiation.
242
Thus, mediation parties may be redefined as "individuals with
interpersonal or psychologically based problems" rather than as "rights-
bearing subjects." 243  An employee who suffers sexual or racial
23 9 WALTER GELLEORN, THE OMBUDSMAN CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES, OUR
KIND OF OMBUDSMAN 13 (1970).
240 GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZEN'S PROTECTORS IN NINE COUNTRIES,
supra note 37, at 432.
241 Many, if not most, organizational ombudspersons do not take a proactive approach
to dispute resolution. Instead, they discuss the problem, ask questions, explore options and
may make informal recommendations. See Rowe Interview, supra note 79. Dr. Rowe states
that the powers of reason and persuasion are very powerful. Often a simple informal request
for records produces marked changes in conduct. See id.
24 2 Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship:
From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENy. U.L.
REV. 437, 479 (1989).
243 Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transfonnation of Civil
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discrimination or harassment should not be expected to compromise with
the harasser to reach an agreement in a mediation. The employee should be
informed of her options, including her right to file a formal legal complaint;
if she chooses not to do so or if the harassment or discrimination may be
difficult to prove in a court of law, she should know that something will be
done to stop the behavior. An ombuds office can take action, investigating
the wrongdoing and recommending action, either to the wrongdoer or, in
exceptional circumstances, to the CEO, or to the organization's governing
board. The ombudsperson should advise the complainant and the
wrongdoer of the actions taken. The ombuds office's power to publicize
wrongdoing, either within the organization or to the public at large
(depending upon the type of organization and the nature of the problem),
serves as the sword of Damocles, encouraging prompt action.
As with any dispute resolution mechanism that falls short of full-
fledged adversarial litigation, the ombuds concept may not satisfy those who
insist that litigation is the only legitimate means to resolve disputes. But it
clearly addresses more of the critics' concerns than does mediation.
Rather than simply settling a dispute between two or more parties, the
classically-modeled ombuds office seeks to achieve justice and integrity.
Because the ombudsperson possesses both legal and mediation skills244 and
experience, he ip more likely to anticipate and recognize power imbalances
and deception and to possess the ability to deal with them.
Because the ombudsperson has power to conduct an independent
investigation, including the power to "subpoena" witnesses and documents,
there is far less risk of party coercion. Unlike the mediator who takes the
parties at their word, the ombudsperson has the power and duty to
investigate the facts fully and is therefore more likely to uncover latent
power imbalances.
If "U]ust results are accurate results..."; if "[tihe determination of
'certain' or 'true' results is central to adjudication results and processes
[and] [t]he process of fact finding is essentially a quest for truth or
Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & Soc'Y REv. 497, 504 (1993). See also RICHARD
HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE EXPANSION OF THE
INFORMAL STATE 132 (1987).
244 There is lively debate within mediation circles about the requisite skills which
mediators should possess. Lawyer-mediators advocate a law degree as a minimal qualification,
while non-lawyers argue that lawyers are actually less qualified than non-lawyers because they
are trained to be adversarial and non-neutral, while non-lawyers can easily learn the minimal
law required to serve as a neutral. Lawyer-mediators respond that knowing the law is crucial,
and that mediation skills can be learned fairly quickly. Most ombudspersons would agree that
mediation skills and legal knowledge are helpful, regardless of whether or not accompanied
by a particular college degree.
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reality," 245 then the ombuds office with its broad investigatory power is
more likely than mediation to achieve justice. It is also more likely that a
party will be more truthful if he knows that the ombudsperson has the
resources and expertise to ascertain the truth. The ombuds office carries
with it the potential to satisfy those who argue that present ADR processes
produce results that "may be qualitatively defective due to a lack of
information needed to produce 'accurate' results." 4
Ensuring that the ombudsperson is sensitive to multicultural
perspectives or, better yet, that culturally diverse ombudspersons participate
together in a dispute which involves culturally diverse parties, serves to
allay some of the legitimate concerns which have been expressed about
mediation. In this respect, having multiple ombudspersons offers advantages
over litigation, where the judge's decision or jury's verdict may reflect the
decisionmakers' personal biases.
The ombudsperson's independence contributes as well to the assurance
that those who represent a minority position will receive assistance. Just as
a federal judge with lifetime tenure may more easily resist the pressure of
prevailing public sentiment than a state judge who is subject to election
every few years, so too may the ombudsperson feel free to resolve a dispute
contrary to the prevailing winds. In fact, one well-known ombudsperson has
stated that the ombud's purpose "is to foster values and decent behavior-
fairness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity, and respect," and that the
"ombudsperson often will be especially concerned with respect for those
who are-or who see themselves as-less powerful than others in a given
situation." 247 Given that the ombudperson's responsibility is to the
organization as a whole, attending to the complaints of all constituents is
more likely to advance the organization's interests than to permit grievances
of even a minority of the constituents to fester.
The independence and status of the ombuds office also increases the
likelihood that it will be perceived as a more formal process than mediation,
thereby discouraging the expression of racist or sexist attitudes.248 An
ombudsperson who reports directly to the highest level of administration
and has the kind of power proposed herein is more likely to reflect higher
societal values.
Critics of alternative dispute resolution who assert that it may inhibit
political upheaval, increase societal dependence upon informal mechanisms
and thereby strengthen (in this case) the organizational hand, may not find
2 45 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality ofAltemate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 1, 34 (1987).
24 6 1d. at55.
247 Rowe, supra note 34, at 103.
248 See supra text accompanying notes 173-176.
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the ombuds office any more acceptable. In fact, such critics may find it even
more objectionable because the resolution mechanism is "controlled" by the
organization itself. For example, a university ombudsperson is ultimately
hired by and answerable to a university provost, president or governing
board.
But the current alternative to both formal and informal in-house
mechanisms (including the ombuds office) is formal adjudication. As long
as such adjudication continues to represent an enormous outlay of time,
emotion and money, most complaints will not be heard there. ADR critics
recognize this current dilemma but anticipate that when the situation gets
bad enough, workers will revolt and throw off their chains. Thus, major
structural change will occur.
Such is not the current climate. Labor unions have lost members and
power in recent years and continue their four decade-long decline. 249 Many
'orkers are grateful to have jobs at all, even with declining wages. Rather
than await the revolution, alternatives to litigation must be available. And
the ombuds office represents a more effective alternative than mediation.
Furthermore, because of the ombudsperson's experience, skills and
independence, she is more likely to effect structural or organizational
change for the benefit of the employees.
Another criticism of employers' usual internal complaint procedures is
that "the rhetorics of management and therapy are far more pervasive in
organizational complaint handlers' accounts [and that] there is almost no
language about legal rights."250 This observation could well be made about
dispute resolution mechanisms based primarily on a mediation model. But
historically, such criticism has not been made about the classical ombuds
office. That office, endowed with expertise, autonomy and power, has been
one of activism, emphasizing the role of "citizen defender," structural
reformer and watchdog.
In a recent study of the Hawaii ombudsman's office, at least 372
complaint cases involving reform were recorded over a period spanning
fifteen years. Additionally, another 110 cases were identified as
"appearing" to involve an administrative reform. 251 Fifty-three percent of
those reforms were deemed "substantive" rather than merely procedural;
24 9 See Steven Greenhouse, Unions Looking South to Find New Members, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1996, at A13; Peter T. Kilborn, With New Militancy, Nation's Unions Hope to Drive
Republicans from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1996, at A10.
250 Edelman, supra note 243, at 529-530 (interviewing complaint handlers in ten
organizations).
251 Larry B. Hill, The Ombudsman and Bureaucratic Reform 2 (Aug. 28-31, 1986)
(paper presented at 1986 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C.).
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twenty-four percent of those involved amending a law, regulation or policy
or codifying rules; fifteen percent involved requiring compliance with an
existing law, regulation or policy.252 The goal of this ombuds office was
clearly not limited to preserving the peace or bringing about resolution.
Given this strong record, it appears that the office of the ombudsperson may
not only treat the symptoms of a diseased bureaucracy; it may serve, as the
cure for the underlying illness itself.
VII. CONCLUSION
It would be foolhardy to suggest that one dispute resolution
mechanism-litigation, mediation or arbitration, among others-is most
appropriate for all disputes. Disputes and disputants vary wildly. The past
fifteen years have produced a variety of techniques for problem-solving, but
mediation appears to have led the field, gaining many devoted adherents.
However, just as litigation may not best resolve some disputes, neither may
mediation.
Although the 1960s and 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the growth of
the ombuds office in the United States, the ombuds office seems to have
been overlooked by ADR proponents in the 1980s mediation boom. This
article suggests that reliance upon the classical ombuds characteristics offers
significant advantages over mediation in some contexts, most particularly
within an organization or bureaucracy. This article also proposes that the
organizational ombuds office, as it has developed in the United States, has
strayed too far from the classical model. A closer alliance with the classical
ombuds model may result not only in resolution of disputes but may also
better reflect just results and effect beneficial structural change.
252 See id. at 3.
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